



SRI LANKAN ECONOMY 2025 JAN. – 2026 JUNE

Group - 04

This report looks at how Sri Lanka's economy is getting back on its feet in 2025 and 2026 after the big financial crisis in 2022. Thanks to help from the IMF, tourism is coming back, and stronger factories, the economy is growing again instead of shrinking. Inflation has calmed down, making prices more stable for everyday people. However, the country still faces real challenges like repairing damage from bad weather events, keeping government debt low, and keeping life affordable. Overall, Sri Lanka is moving in the right direction, but it needs to stay careful and stick to smart money management to fully recover

Executive Summary

Sri Lanka's economic trajectory from 2019 through 2026 presents a complex case of cumulative systemic vulnerabilities, internal governance failures, and severe external shocks. Historically, the collapse of foreign exchange reserves was driven by domestic policy distortions including unbudgeted tax cuts, money printing, a catastrophic 2021 synthetic fertilizer ban, and unaddressed trade mis-invoicing. These structural weaknesses were further compounded by institutional corruption, high-profile financial scandals, and a crippling demographic brain drain. While aggressive legislative overhauls and adherence to an IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) restored macroeconomic momentum by 2025–2026 yielding a 5.0% real GDP expansion and a historic 5.4% primary budget surplus the nation's fiscal buffer remained critically thin.

The primary finding of this case study is that while domestic policy missteps built the fragile baseline for bankruptcy, **the 2026 Middle East War and Maritime Crisis delivered the definitive, catastrophic blow to Sri Lanka's economic stabilization.** Unlike localized domestic crises or single-sector hits like the 2019 Easter Bombings and Cyclone Ditwah, the 2026 geopolitical shock acted as an unjudgeable external wall. It simultaneously attacked every pillar of Sri Lanka's Balance of Payments, which triggered a 149.9% surge in fuel import bills, raising freight rates by up to 40%, imperiling Gulf worker remittances, and forcing the Central Bank to burn nearly \$900 million in foreign reserves. Operating across all macroeconomic transmission channels without possibility of internal legislative remedy, this external shock ultimately neutralized the state's hard-won primary surpluses and sealed the nation's economic paralysis.

Sri Lankan Economy (2025-2026)

Macroeconomic Recovery and Growth Dynamics

Sri Lanka's economic recovery gained momentum throughout 2025, recording an overall real GDP growth rate of 5.0%. Growth was driven by a strong rebound in manufacturing (particularly textiles and food production), construction, and financial and tourism-related services. To spur private credit expansion and support business recovery, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) reduced its Policy Rate (OPR) to 7.75%. Improved foreign currency availability led the government to lift vehicle import restrictions, boosting domestic trade, consumer confidence, and government import tax revenues.

Evidence Source: <https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/srilanka>

Inflation Trends and Price Level Stabilization

The economy transitioned away from deflation during 2025. Headline inflation had plummeted to negative territory (-4.2% in February 2025) due to lower energy prices, utility rate cuts, and currency appreciation. However, as domestic demand rebounded and domestic energy pricing normalized, price levels began rising again in August 2025. Inflation continued on a steady, controlled path, reaching 7.3% by May 2026.

Evidence Source: <https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/sri-lanka-economy->

IMF Program Execution and Debt Restructuring

Sri Lanka maintained consistent progress under its 4-year, \$3 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the International Monetary Fund. The country completed its Third Review in March 2025, followed by its Fourth Review in July 2025, and a combined Fifth and Sixth Review in May 2026. This brought total IMF disbursements under the program to over \$2 billion. Concurrently, external debt restructuring neared full completion, with final bilateral debt agreements signed across 17 Official Creditor Committee (OCC) member countries and over 98% participation in sovereign bond exchanges.

Evidence Source:

[International Monetary Fund — Sri Lanka EFF Program Reports](#)



External Sector, Reserves, and Fiscal Indicators

Foreign exchange liquidity improved substantially, with usable FX reserves expanding to \$5.4 billion by mid-2025. This stability was anchored by strong tourism income and worker remittance inflows, which kept the current account resilient. On the fiscal front, tax reforms (including structural VAT enhancements) enabled the primary budget surplus to reach record highs, helping reduce total public debt to approximately 102%–105% of GDP.

Evidence Source:

[Ministry of Finance & Central Bank — Official Investor Presentation](#)

External Shocks and 2026 Growth Projections

Despite early momentum, growth was projected to moderate to around 3.0% for 2026 due to two key economic headwinds. First, catastrophic flooding caused by Cyclone Ditwah damaged critical infrastructure and agriculture, generating \$4.1 billion in estimated recovery and reconstruction costs that were added to the 2026 budget. Second, global geopolitical tensions in the Middle East led to global energy market volatility. In response, the IMF allowed temporary fiscal easing and emergency financial assistance to preserve economic stability.

Evidence Source:


IMF Press Release — Combined 5th and 6th EFF Reviews & Economic Assessment


Metric	Performance	Primary Source Link
Real GDP Growth	5.0% in 2025; projected ~3.5% in 2026	https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/news/cbsl-releases-aer-2025
Inflation (CCPI)	-4.2% (Deflation in Feb 2025); normalized positive by Aug 2025	https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/10/07/sri-lanka-s-economic-recovery-remains-incomplete-as-key-challenges-remain
IMF Support	Completed Third Review of \$3B Extended Fund Facility (\$334M payout)	https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/srilanka/publication/sri-lanka-development-update-2025 https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/news/cbsl-releases-aer-2025
Public Debt / GDP	Reduced to ~102.4% (down from 111.7% in 2023)	https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/srilanka/publication/sri-lanka-development-update-2025
External Debt	Completed Eurobond exchange (98% participation) & bilateral terms	https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2025/02/28/pr25053-sri-lanka-imf-completes-the-3rd-rev-under-the-eff https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/srilanka/publication/sri-lanka-development-update-2025

<https://tradingeconomics.com/sri-lanka/full-year-gdp-growth>

<https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/news/ccpi-inflation-july-2026>

<https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/view/journals/002/2026/111/article-A000-en.pdf>





- Let's take a look at what led to Sri Lanka's economic situation in 2025–2026, starting back in 2019.

2019 Easter Bomb Blast

This delivered the first big blow to the country's foreign exchange inflows, leaving tourism sector already fragile before COVID – 19.

On April 21, 2019, suicide bombings targeted 3 luxury hotels in Colombo and 3 churches. Because foreign tourists were directly targeted, the immediate impact was severe.

1. Elight Cancellations – Over 37 countries issued strict travel advisories warning, citizens, against visiting Sri Lanka.
2. Plunge in Arrivals – Tourist arrivals plunged by 71% year over year in May 2019. Daily arrivals plummeted from an average of 7600 down to under 1700.
3. Revenue Losses - Sri Lanka was on track to generate \$5 Billion in tourism revenue for 2019 after hitting a record peak in 2018 (\$4.4 billion) Instead, annual tourism earnings fell by nearly \$ 800 million to \$ 3.6 billion.

The attack exposed financial fragility across Sri Lanka's hospitality sector well before the pandemic.

- To prevent bankruptcy among hotel chains, tour operators and small businesses, the government and CBSL introduced moratoriums in May 2019.
- These moratoriums allowed tourism businesses to defer capital and interest payments on their commercial bank loan.
- Because COVID – 19 hits less than a year later moratoriums had to be extended repeatedly. Tourism businesses accumulated layers of unpaid interest and debt for 3 – 4 years, crediting a massive file of bad loans (NPLs) for Sri Lankan banks.

- <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/24/sri-lanka-spy-chief-blamed-for-failures-over-easter-bombings>



Sri Lanka bombings: spy chief lambasted in damning report

Investigation finds series of intelligence and coordination lapses prior to deadly attacks

Michael Safi

Thu 24 Oct 2019 11:29 BST

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A damning Sri Lankan parliamentary investigation has outlined extensive lapses of intelligence and coordination before the Easter Sunday bombings that killed 269 people, and concluded the spy chief was primarily to blame for the failure to stop the attacks.

The report, released on Wednesday, found the former head of the state intelligence service, Nilantha Jayawardena, had received information about possible attacks as early as 4 April, 17 days before the suicide bombings took place, but was slow to share the intelligence with relevant officials.

It said he was invited to share details of the specific warning of an impending attack at a coordination meeting of leading intelligence



Sri Lanka bombings: three months on, tourism workers tell their stories

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The report said the extremist preacher Mohamed Zahran, the alleged ringleader of the attacks, who was among eight terrorists who blew themselves up on 21 April, had been on the radar of authorities from


2015 and an arrest warrant had been issued for him in March 2017.

By 14 April, a week before the attacks, police were conducting searches for Zahran and his known associates. The next day, authorities managed to get his Facebook page removed. An attempt to do so two years before had received no response from the company, the report said.

On 16 April, a motorcycle was blown up in the eastern city of Kattankudy. Jayawardena told the committee he believed the incident was "a dry run" and said he had warned other officials: "You have to take this seriously, because this is definitely a blast. This is Zahran's activity. We cannot take it lightly."



COVID 19 Impact



01.Tourism Collapse

By late 2019, intensive promotional campaigns and security assurance helped tourism begin a rapid recovery by December 2019; monthly arrivals were almost back to pre- attack levels.

Before the sector could build back its foreign currency reserves or clear its debts, COVID 19 shut down global travel in March 2020

Following the global outbreak, Sri Lanka closed its international airports to tourists' arrivals on March 18, 2020. (Tourists arrivals crashed by 507,704 in 2020 and hit an all-time low of 194,495 in 2021.

Foreign currency earnings from tourism collapsed from \$4.66 billion in 2019 down to \$ 1.08 billion in 2020 and just \$615 million in 2021, (86% + loss in revenue within 2 years)

02.Export

Factories in Sri Lanka couldn't get fabric and thread from China because shipping stopped. America and Europe clothes store also closed doors, so buyers cancelled millions of dollars in clothing order.

Sri Lanka sells a lot of tea to the world for over 150 years tea was bought and sold in person at big auctions in Colombo. Lockdown meant people couldn't meant to buy tea.

The trade paused until Sri Lanka quickly build an online bidding system. When a country sells exports, it earns US dollars because exports dropped and tourists stopped coming, Sri Lanka barely earned in any dollars in 2020.

Without US dollars coming from exports, Sri Lanka couldn't pay to import vital everyday items from ither countries like fuel, cooking gas, medicine and food.

This sudden loss of export money was one of the biggest sparks that caused Sri Lanka's major economic crisis a couple of years later.

03.Suffered Worker remittances.

Single largest source of foreign currency for Sri Lanka. During COVID19, remittances experienced a sharp roller coaster effect.

Thousands of Sri Lankan workers in the middle east, Europe, and Asia lost jobs or wage cuts as business closed. Physical money transfer agents closed, preventing workers from sending money through bank branches. Migration out of Sri Lanka dropped by over 50%.

Despite initial fears, official remittances defied expectations and increased in 2020 to reach around \$7.1 billion

- Travel bans stopped people carrying physical cash across borders, forcing almost all money through official banking channels.
- Returning laid off workers remitted all their accumulated savings and severance pay before flying back to Sri Lanka
- Diaspora and migrant workers sent extra money home to help families cope with local lockdown costs.

In 2021, official remittances plummeted sharply due to government currency controls

- The central bank pegged the US dollar around 200LKR which was much lower than the actual market value.
- Workers stopped using official banks and switched to informal black market money transfer networks, which paid up to 250 -300LKR per dollar

As a result, official banking remittances dropped by nearly 50% by late 2021, severely straining the government of official foreign reserves.

This sudden drop in official remittances in 2021, combined with loss of tourism and exports, directly accelerated Sri Lanka's historic foreign exchange shortage in 2022.

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/sri-lankas-economic-crisis-dashes-hopes-post-covid-19-tourism-recovery-2022-04-22/>



[12] An officer wearing protective gear walks inside the airport as Sri Lanka's government scheduled to reopen the country's airports for tourists from January 21, 2021, as they were closed since March. [Purchase Licensing Rights](#)  [Read more](#)

Tourism earned Sri Lanka \$4.4 billion and contributed 5.6% to GDP in 2018, but this dropped to just 0.8% in 2020. However, arrivals topped 100,000 in March for the first time in two years, Sri Lanka's tourism office said. Overall tourism numbers are higher than they were in 2021, marking what many thought would be a pandemic revival.



Illegal activity

1. Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) and Mis-Invoicing

Trade-based money laundering and mis-invoicing became one of the biggest hidden drains on Sri Lanka's economy between 2023 and 2026. This illegal activity happens when corrupt import and export companies lie on their official customs papers about the true price, quantity, or quality of the goods they are shipping. By deliberately writing down lower prices for the products they sell to other countries (under-invoicing) or writing down higher prices for things they buy from abroad (over-invoicing), these businesses manage to hide their real cash profits. Instead of bringing these valuable US dollars back to Sri Lanka to help the local economy, the companies secretly keep the wealth tucked away in offshore bank accounts. Historical audits revealed that this bad practice caused a massive loss of about 4 billion US dollars every single year.

To fight this massive drain of foreign currency, the Criminal Investigation Department launched a high-priority investigation following suspicious customs reports submitted in early 2026. This massive probe reached a major milestone in late July 2026 when police arrested several ringleaders. The authorities discovered that these operators had used fake invoices to execute 10,156 fraudulent transactions, illegally transferring over 715 million dollars straight to Dubai and starving the local banking system of essential foreign reserves. The government has since increased scrutiny on international wire transfers and cargo inspections at major ports. By implementing stricter automated cross-checking software, customs officials can now instantly flag when a company tries to report an unrealistic price for a shipment compared to global market rates.

2. The Undiyal and Hawala Shadow Financial Systems

The Undiyal and Hawala systems are informal, unregulated money transfer networks that operate completely outside the regular banking grid. Millions of dollars are diverted away from Sri Lanka's official economy every year because many migrant workers choose to send their hard-earned money back home through these secret channels instead of using official commercial banks. These underground networks are popular because they offer higher black-market exchange rates, complete anonymity, and do not require any formal paperwork or identity verification. While this might seem convenient for individuals, it creates a massive problem for the nation. It deprives the Central Bank of Sri Lanka of the official foreign currency remittances it desperately needs to pay for national debts and stabilize the local currency. Furthermore, because these channels are completely unmonitored, international drug syndicates and criminals frequently use them to launder illegal cash.

To deal with this growing threat, state regulators held a major briefing on June 30, 2026, and officially changed the law on July 6, 2026. They slashed the formal registration capital requirement for money transfer businesses from 20 million rupees down to 15 million rupees, aiming to force these underground dealers to get legal licenses and join the regulated banking system. Additionally, commercial banks have started introducing specialized low-fee digital remittance apps with faster processing times to compete directly with these illicit networks. By giving migrant workers, a safer, cheaper, and faster way to send

money home legally, the state hopes to redirect billions of dollars back into the formal economy. This strategy is seen as essential for rebuilding the country's national foreign currency reserves.

<https://www.themorning.lk/articles/rLkqNUuN9T7N4paYJz7y>



3. Commercial Fuel Hoarding and Black-Market Fraud ring

When global energy conflicts and natural disasters disrupted fuel supplies in early 2026, the Sri Lankan government had to bring back the digital Fuel Pass QR-code rationing system to distribute gasoline and diesel fairly. However, this restriction quickly triggered a wave of illegal commercial hoarding and black-market fraud ring. Organized criminal groups began using fake vehicle chassis numbers, cloning legitimate QR codes, and stealing the identities of inactive citizens to buy extra fuel quotas. These syndicates then accumulated tens of thousands of liters of fuel in private depots and hidden vehicle tanks, intentionally creating a fake shortage at regular pumping stations. This forced ordinary citizens into long lines and drove up transport costs, which directly inflated the price of everyday food items.

To protect the public, the Inspector General of Police ordered a massive, month-long nationwide crackdown from March 3 to April 4, 2026. By the end of the raid on April 5, police had arrested thirty-one major commercial racketeers and successfully seized over 52,000 liters of hidden diesel, petrol, and kerosene. Local magistrates supported the crackdown by handing down tough punishments, including a notable jail sentence on March 27, 2026, for a motorist caught reselling fuel on the street. Following these intense raids, the Ministry of Power and Energy integrated biometrics into the digital Fuel Pass app to verify the identity of vehicle owners at the pump. This technology upgrade has effectively stopped syndicates from using stolen or cloned QR codes to hoard fuel, restoring order and fairness to gas stations nationwide.

<https://english.news.cn/asiapacific/20260405/226b5768503c4d11baf5e6f882bd2eb2/c.html>



4. High-Value Contraband, Gold, and Narcotics Smuggling

Sri Lanka's strategic location in the center of the Indian Ocean has unfortunately made it a primary transit corridor for international smuggling rings. Throughout late 2025 and the first half of 2026, maritime trafficking networks aggressively used deep-sea fishing trawlers and coastal routes to move massive quantities of illegal goods across borders. These contraband items totally evade mandatory customs duties and tariffs, stripping the government treasury of vital tax revenues used to balance national fiscal deficits. The multi-billion-rupee profits from this illegal trade are then injected into the local market through cash-based luxury retail and real estate purchases, which deeply distorts legitimate local businesses.

To stop this cross-border flow, Sri Lanka Customs, the Navy, and the Coast Guard launched an aggressive maritime dragnet that successfully seized over 4.5 billion rupees worth of hard narcotics over several months. The most shocking terminal intercept occurred on April 26, 2026, at the Bandaranaike International Airport. Alert terminal authorities disrupted a highly organized counterfeit syndicate arriving on a flight from Bangkok. The smugglers had dressed up as a fake travel delegation of Buddhist monks to avoid suspicion, but officers searched their bags and discovered 110 kilograms of high-grade cannabis worth 1.1 billion rupees hidden inside false-bottom suitcases. Security frameworks at all airports have since been upgraded, introducing advanced X-ray luggage scanners and increasing the presence of undercover narcotics officers to monitor passenger behavior.

5. Transnational "Cyber Scam Factories" and Crypto Fraud

During the first half of 2026, international criminal syndicates, primarily driven out of Southeast Asian hubs, illegally shifted their operations into Sri Lanka. Traveling on standard tourist visas, these foreign networks rented large private villas in popular tourist towns and Colombo's suburbs to establish hidden, heavily fortified "cyber scam factories." Inside these compounds, hundreds of operators used illegal computer systems and fake mobile applications to run international crypto fraud schemes, romance scams, and predatory investment networks. Two very popular blacklisted platforms, known as the *SGO* and *MTFE* apps, operated complex pyramid schemes that siphoned billions of rupees out of unsuspecting local retail consumers. This money was immediately converted into untraceable digital cryptocurrency and sent to offshore wallets, causing a massive financial drain on regular citizens.

Law enforcement agencies responded with heavy synchronized raids across the island. On March 17, 2026, police apprehended 134 foreign nationals in a major raid, followed by another targeted strike on May 3, 2026, which neutralized a cyber-fraud outpost in Talangama and caught thirty-seven operators. This law enforcement push concluded with a massive legal milestone on June 20, 2026, when the government chartered a specialized flight to formally deport eighty-five convicted cybercriminals, while the Central Bank blacklisted twenty-two fraudulent financial apps on July 1, 2026. Following these events, the Department of Immigration tightened rules for foreign nationals requesting long-term tourist visa extensions. Landlords are now legally required to report any foreign tenants renting large properties to local police stations within twenty-four hours to prevent these secret internet centers from reopening.

6. Transnational Gold Smuggling and Duty Evasion

Transnational gold smuggling became a major fiscal problem for Sri Lanka between late 2025 and mid-2026. Because gold prices were rising rapidly across global markets and the Sri Lankan government maintained strict limits on importing luxury items, criminal syndicates saw a big opportunity to make illegal profits by evading heavy customs duties. These smuggling groups heavily targeted the Bandaranaike International Airport transit corridors and regional sea routes across the Palk Strait, hiding gold biscuits and crude jewelry inside electronic appliances, clothing, and body cavities. To avoid aviation security checks at the main airport, syndicates actively adapted by utilizing regional passenger ferries.

In a highly coordinated maritime strike on June 17–18, 2026, Sri Lanka Customs units intercepted twenty-six passengers including seventeen Indian nationals and nine Sri Lankans attempting a synchronized gold smuggling run aboard a regional ferry traveling from Kankesanthurai Port to India. This border sweep was accompanied by a high-profile airport arrest on July 9, 2026, where the Police Narcotics Bureau apprehended a prominent fifty-three-year-old businessman from Matale arriving from Dubai. A physical search of his luggage uncovered twelve gold necklaces, ten gold bracelets, and two solid gold biscuits weighing exactly 271.48 grams and valued at over 11 million rupees. The state immediately confiscated the gold, and the court imposed a formal 1 million rupee fine under the Customs Ordinance. To combat this permanently, airport security has introduced advanced metal detection arches that can spot hidden gold even when it is disguised inside heavy consumer electronics.

<https://www.newswire.lk/2026/08/05/sri-lanka-blocks-24-illegal-online-gambling-websites-full-list/>



7. Illegal Online Gambling and Unauthorized Sports Betting

The sudden explosion of unlicensed offshore gambling websites and unauthorized sports betting applications emerged as a severe threat to Sri Lanka's digital currency reserves and household financial stability in 2026. Operating via untraceable digital mirrors, alternative proxy servers, and local mobile money gateways, these unregulated platforms actively targeted younger consumers in direct violation of the strict provisions of the newly active Gambling Regulatory Authority Act. This shadow gambling economy systematically evaded national taxation, drained billions in foreign currency out of the country to foreign bank accounts and triggered a sharp rise in local consumer debt complaints as thousands of players lost their life savings.

To halt these unauthorized financial outflows and protect local families, the government launched an aggressive digital crackdown that peaked between August 5 and August 7, 2026. The Telecommunications Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka, acting on an explicit directive from the Gambling Regulatory Authority under the Ministry of Finance, first blocked access to twenty-four major illegal online gambling websites operating without local licenses, including prominent global syndicates such as *1xBet*, *Bet365*, *Stake*, and *Betway*. Within forty-eight hours, the Ministry of Digital Economy expanded the internet service provider firewall by adding another ninety-eight unauthorized gambling portals to the national blocklist, successfully cutting off the primary digital pathways used by these offshore networks. Furthermore, local mobile network providers were ordered to disable all digital wallet payments connected to these blocked domains to ensure no more local money could be sent to these illegal systems.


<https://www.newswire.lk/2026/08/05/sri-lanka-blocks-24-illegal-online-gambling-websites-full-list/>

8. Intellectual Property Piracy and Counterfeit Medicine Distribution

Organized criminal syndicates severely undermined domestic economic recovery and public health infrastructure by weaponizing retail distribution loopholes to flood local markets with pirated consumer goods and counterfeit or expired pharmaceuticals. This illegal trade took advantage of supply chain shortages following recent natural disasters to distribute dangerous items like expired pills, counterfeit medical injections, unlabeled hospital devices, and fake automotive components bearing copied global brand labels. This copied trade did not just strip legitimate domestic manufacturers and pharmacies of vital business revenue; it posed an immediate, life-threatening danger to citizens who unknowingly bought sub-standard medical drugs.

To fight this dangerous market, the Consumer Affairs Authority spent months running a massive nationwide inspection campaign that lasted until August 4, 2026. In total, investigators executed a collective total of 471 special pharmacy raids nationwide during this timeframe. A highly targeted operational push conducted on August 3 and 4, 2026, inspected 109 local drugstores and successfully exposed 86 severe statutory violations. This multi-agency operation resulted in the immediate seizure and destruction of truckloads of dangerous medical goods, while local courts clamped down on the perpetrators by imposing over 2.2 million rupees in immediate financial penalties. Following these large-scale seizures, the National Medicines Regulatory Authority launched a public smartphone app that allows consumers to scan the barcode of any medicine bottle to check its authenticity and expiration date instantly before buying it.

<https://www.instagram.com/p/DbsrihMD-f1/>



Acceleration of Demographic Brain Drain

4.2.1 Depletion of Critical Public Infrastructure

Sri Lanka has experienced a significant increase in the migration of highly skilled professionals following the economic crisis. Many doctors, engineers, academics, scientists, agricultural specialists, and information technology professionals have migrated overseas in search of higher salaries, better working conditions, career advancement opportunities, and greater economic stability. Research indicates that more than half of state university graduates migrate permanently, while migration rates in critical professions such as medicine, engineering, and agriculture are estimated to range between 80% and 90%. In addition, more than 2,500 doctors and medical specialists have reportedly left Sri Lanka in recent years.

The departure of these highly skilled professionals has created serious labor shortages within essential public institutions. Hospitals face shortages of specialist doctors, increasing patient waiting times and reducing the quality of healthcare services. Universities struggle to retain qualified lecturers and researchers, weakening higher education and research capacity. Government institutions also experience shortages of experienced technical professionals responsible for infrastructure development and policy implementation. These shortages reduce the efficiency of public services and limit the country's institutional capacity to support sustainable economic development.

<https://ceylonpublicaffairs.com/sri-lankas-brain-drain-crisis/>

<https://lankawebsites.com/blog/home-and-life-style/sri-lankas-brain-drain-crisis-2026-why-30-of-graduates-are-leaving-and-what-it-costs-the-economy>

https://www.allsocialsciencejournal.com/uploads/archives/20251212152057_SER-2025-6-029.1.pdf



4.2.2 Loss of Public Educational Investment

Sri Lanka's free education system has historically been one of the country's greatest social achievements and represents a major public investment in human capital development. The government spends approximately Rs. 87 billion annually on university education to produce skilled graduates who can contribute to national economic growth and development.

However, when graduates permanently migrate overseas shortly after completing their education, Sri Lanka receives little economic return on this substantial public investment. Destination countries benefit from a highly educated workforce without bearing the costs of educating these professionals, while Sri Lanka loses both its financial investment and valuable human capital. Consequently, the government must continue allocating significant public funds to educate new generations of students while simultaneously replacing experienced professionals who have emigrated. This reduces the long-term economic benefits of public expenditure on higher education and places additional pressure on government finances.

<https://ceylonpublicaffairs.com/sri-lankas-brain-drain-crisis/>

<https://ceylonpublicaffairs.com/sri-lankas-brain-drain-crisis/>

4.2.3 Erosion of Long-term Innovation and Economic Growth

Highly skilled professionals are essential for scientific research, technological innovation, entrepreneurship, productivity improvement, and industrial modernization. They contribute to developing new technologies, improving business processes, increasing competitiveness, and attracting both domestic and foreign investment. When these professionals migrate permanently, the country's stock of human

capital declines, reducing its ability to generate innovation and achieve sustainable long-term economic growth.

The loss of researchers, engineers, academics, medical specialists, and technology professionals weakens Sri Lanka's research institutions, limits technological advancement, and slows the development of high-value industries. Businesses also face greater difficulty recruiting qualified employees with specialized skills, reducing productivity and competitiveness. Although no Sri Lankan study has directly quantified the impact of brain drain on innovation, international economic research consistently identifies human capital as one of the most important determinants of productivity, innovation, and long-term economic development. Therefore, the continued migration of skilled workers is expected to reduce Sri Lanka's future growth potential and delay its transition towards a knowledge-based economy.

<https://lankawebsites.com/blog/home-and-life-style/sri-lankas-brain-drain-crisis-2026-why-30-of-graduates-are-leaving-and-what-it-costs-the-economy>

<https://dl.lib.uom.lk/items/bae06817-43eb-4cf1-b4a8-2402e37e33c8/full>




4.2.4 Weakened Tax Base

Highly skilled professionals generally earn higher incomes than the national average and contribute significantly to government revenue through personal income taxes, corporate taxes, and indirect taxes generated by their economic activities. The permanent migration of these professionals reduces the number of high-income taxpayers within Sri Lanka and therefore decreases the government's revenue-raising capacity.

At the same time, government expenditure on healthcare, education, infrastructure, public administration, social welfare, and debt servicing continues to increase. A smaller tax base limits the government's ability

to finance these essential public services and development programmed without increasing borrowing or taxation on the remaining workforce. Although no official Sri Lankan study has quantified the exact reduction in tax revenue caused by brain drain, economic theory and international research consistently show that the loss of highly skilled workers weakens fiscal sustainability because these individuals make a disproportionately large contribution to national income and tax revenue. As a result, continued professional migration may reduce the government's ability to support long-term economic recovery and maintain fiscal stability.

<https://economynext.com/sri-lankas-brain-drain-could-slow-economic-growth-central-bank-205332/>



Governance issues and scandals

1. The Central Bank Bond Scam (2015–2016)

- **Entities & Key Individuals Involved:**

- Former Central Bank Governor Lakshman Arjuna Mahendran
- His son-in-law Arjun Aloysius
- Primary dealer firm Perpetual Treasuries Limited (PTL)

- Former Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake
 - Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) Public Debt Department
- **Deep Dive into the Incident:** In February 2015 and March 2016, Central Bank Governor Arjuna Mahendran interfered in standard Treasury bond auctions. The CBSL announced an intent to raise LKR 1 billion in 30-year government bonds, but secretly accepted bids up to LKR 10 billion at artificially high interest yields (up to 12.5%). PTL, owned by Mahendran's son-in-law Arjun Aloysius, had been tipped off via leaked insider information and submitted massive non-competitive bids. PTL cornered over 50% of the auction and resold the bonds back to state institutions at huge markups, netting over LKR 11 billion in unearned profits at the public's expense.
 - **Governance Failure:** A total breakdown of institutional integrity, failure to enforce conflict-of-interest regulations, and a complete breach of auction transparency within the nation's supreme monetary authority.
 - **Transmission & 2025–2026 Economic Impact:**
 - **Permanent Debt-Servicing Burden:** Because these 30-year sovereign bonds were issued at artificially inflated interest rates, the Sri Lankan Treasury remains locked into paying these exorbitant coupon rates through 2025 and 2026. This directly squeezes current national budgets, making interest payments one of the largest line items preventing spending on public services.
 - **Credit Rating Collapse & Forced IMF Dependence:** The market manipulation shattered global investor confidence in Sri Lanka's central monetary operations, kicking off a cascade of downgrades from international credit rating agencies. By 2025–2026, Sri Lanka remained shut out of affordable commercial global capital markets, leaving the country with no choice but to rely on severe, high-tax IMF revenue programs to service state debt.

EVIDENCE

Official Documents & Legal Evidence Links

- [Presidential Commission of Inquiry \(PCoI\) Report Findings](#)
 - Details the findings of the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry (handed over to the President on December 30, 2017). It documents how Arjuna Mahendran was found directly responsible for causing a loss of LKR 11,145 million to public institutions through insider information and auction manipulation.
- [Committee on Public Enterprises \(COPE\) Parliamentary Report](#)

- The 55-page official COPE report, presented to Parliament by Chairman Sunil Handunnetti, ruling former Governor Arjuna Mahendran "directly responsible" for the February 2015 transaction that allowed Perpetual Treasuries Limited (PTL) to corner the bond market.
- [Transparency International Sri Lanka \(TISL\) Governance Statement](#)
 - Independent governance analysis from TISL calling for Attorney General action on conflict-of-interest abuses between Central Bank leadership and private primary dealers.
- [Verité Research Forensic Audit Repository Analysis](#)
 - Comprehensive forensic audit documentation detailing how the bypass of due process and market manipulation in Treasury bond auctions eroded public funds like the Employees' Provident Fund (EPF).



2. The Fertilizer Procurement Scam & Organic Ban (2021)

- **Entities & Key Individuals Involved:**
 - Former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa
 - Former Agriculture Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage
 - Former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa
 - Qingdao Seawin Biotech Group Co., Ltd (Chinese fertilizer supplier)
 - National Plant Quarantine Services (NPQS)

- **Deep Dive into the Incident:** In April 2021, the government abruptly banned all synthetic chemical fertilizers and agrochemicals. To fill the supply deficit, state agricultural authorities bypassed standard international competitive bidding procedures, statutory health checks, and scientific evaluation protocols to award a \$63.6 million contract for 99,000 MT of organic fertilizer to Qingdao Seawin Biotech. When NPQS lab tests revealed the shipment was contaminated with dangerous plant pathogens (*Erwinia* bacteria) capable of destroying local crops, the state turned the vessel away. However, following intense diplomatic pressure and commercial litigation, Sri Lanka paid \$6.7 million in public funds as a settlement to the Chinese firm for a contaminated cargo that was never used.
- **Governance Failure:** Bypassing statutory agricultural safety protocols, overriding competitive public procurement laws, and imposing ad-hoc executive policy without technical or scientific impact assessments.
- **Transmission & 2025–2026 Economic Impact:**
 - **Permanent Crop Yield Ruin & Agricultural Deficit:** The sudden disruption ruined soil quality and crop yields paddy production dropped by nearly 40% and tea exports collapsed. The loss of farming capital caused long-term structural damage, keeping agricultural productivity low through 2025–2026 and preventing a swift post-crisis recovery.
 - **Food Import Drain & Structural Inflation:** Stripped of its food self-sufficiency, Sri Lanka was forced to spend millions of scarce US dollars importing basic staples like rice, sugar, and vegetables during 2025–2026. This ongoing import bill put heavy downward pressure on central bank foreign reserves and sustained high retail food prices across the country.

EVIDENCE

- [National Plant Quarantine Services \(NPQS\) Interception Report](#)
 - Official laboratory test reports from the National Plant Quarantine Services detailing the detection of *Erwinia* pathogens in the 99,000 MT shipment from Qingdao Seawin Biotech, leading to the formal court injunction issued by the Colombo Commercial High Court blocking payments.
- [Parliamentary Standing Orders & COPE Audit Records](#)
 - Official parliamentary records documenting the Auditor General's special audit on organic fertilizer procurement and the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) inquiry into how public funds were committed without following standard procurement guidelines.
- [People's Bank & Colombo Commercial High Court Injunction Records](#)

- Legal proceedings documenting the \$6.7 million settlement payout released following the settlement between the State Mortgage & Investment Bank / People's Bank and the Chinese supplier after the letter of credit (LC) dispute.
- **Human Rights Watch & Verité Research Agricultural Policy Impact Study**
 - Comprehensive policy analysis documenting how bypassing technical oversight and imposing the sudden chemical fertilizer ban resulted in a 40% fall in paddy production, destroying national food security.



3. The Dairy Cow Importation Scheme (2012–2017)

- **Entities & Key Individuals Involved:**
 - Former Rural Economy Minister P. Harrison
 - Ministry Secretary Renuka Ekanayake
 - Wellard Rural Exports Ltd. (Australian Live Exporter)
 - National Livestock Development Board (NLDB)
 - National Audit Office / Auditor General Gamini Wijesinghe
- **Deep Dive into the Incident:**

Under the official goal of achieving national milk self-sufficiency and cutting expensive milk powder imports, state authorities initiated a \$100 million state-underwritten credit agreement (funded via Rabobank and guaranteed by Australia's EFIC). The ministry imported over 5,000 dairy cows from Australia and New Zealand through supplier Wellard Rural Exports.

The scheme bypassed standard procurement checks and ignored a 2008 National Planning Department report warning that temperate breeds were climatically unfit for Sri Lanka. Farmers were charged an inflated price of LKR 200,000 per head (nearly double market value) for cattle that arrived infected with diseases such as *Mycoplasma bovis* and Bovine Viral Diarrhoea (BVD). Hundreds of cows died, suffered spontaneous abortions, or proved infertile, yielding less than half of promised milk yields and forcing participating farmers into foreclosure. Despite these failures, state officials released an unbacked advance payment of over LKR 1.74 billion for a subsequent phase without basic guarantees.

- **Governance Failure:**

Embezzlement masked as rural development, violation of public financial regulations (contracting without Attorney General clearance), absence of advance payment securities, and total negligence in biosecurity oversight.

- **Transmission & 2025–2026 Economic Impact:**

- **Sovereign Foreign Debt Servicing:** The \$100 million foreign loan secured to fund the failed project remained part of Sri Lanka's central sovereign debt portfolio. Repaying these loans (plus over LKR 360 million in direct foreign exchange losses flagged by the Auditor General) continues to strain treasury debt-servicing allocations in 2025–2026.
- **Sustained Import Dependency & High Living Costs:** Because the scheme failed to boost domestic milk production, Sri Lanka remained almost entirely dependent on imported milk powder. In 2025–2026, foreign exchange scarcity and global supply shocks kept retail milk powder prices extraordinarily high, directly impacting child nutrition and household cost-of-living metrics.

Valid Evidence & Official Documentation Links

- [National Audit Office Special Audit Report on Dairy Cattle Import Project](#)
 - Official special audit report by the Auditor General documenting the LKR 1.74 billion idle advance payment, foreign exchange losses, lack of advance security, and missing cabinet clearances.
- [Sri Lanka Auditor General Findings - Daily Mirror Investigative Expose](#)
 - Investigative summary detailing the LKR 520,228 per-cow total cost, distribution anomalies, dead nipples, aborted fetuses, and widespread farmer indebtedness.

- ## THE TRAGIC TALE OF IMPORTED DAIRY COWS



4. The Norochcholai Coal Procurement Fraud (2025–2026)

- **Entities & Key Individuals Involved:**

- Lanka Coal Company (LCC)
- Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB)
- Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE)
- Trident Chemphar Ltd (Middleman Supplier)
- PT Mitra SK Analisa Testama Samarinda (Unaccredited Testing Lab in Indonesia)

- **Deep Dive into the Incident:** During the 2025/2026 procurement cycle for the 900 MW Lakvijaya Power Plant in Norochcholai, Lanka Coal Company (LCC) relaxed registration criteria, allowing unregistered suppliers including middleman firm Trident Chemphar Ltd to submit bids despite tender rules explicitly restricting participation to fully registered entities. Quality testing for 12 incoming coal shipments was assigned to an Indonesian loading-port laboratory (PT Mitra SK Analisa Testama Samarinda) whose license had already been revoked on December 29, 2025. The delivered low-grade coal contained excessive moisture and volatile impurities, causing internal fires, severe boiler damage, and forced emergency shutdowns at the primary baseload power plant.

- **Governance Failure:** Dismantling of energy procurement guidelines, bypass of supplier qualification deadlines, reliance on unaccredited international testing facilities, and failure of internal technical auditing.

- **Transmission & 2025–2026 Economic Impact:**

- **Direct Loss & Emergency Thermal Power Burden:** A Special Audit Report by the Auditor General confirmed a direct financial loss of Rs. 2,237.7 million due to the overconsumption of substandard coal. Forced emergency shutdowns at Norochcholai compelled the CEB to generate expensive alternative thermal power from diesel and heavy fuel oil plants, draining central treasury resources.
- **Tariff Hikes & Industrial Cost Inflation:** To cover these multi-billion-rupee operating deficits, the state-imposed tariff hikes ranging from 26% to 47%. This instantly inflated production and electricity costs for local manufacturers, exporters, and small businesses, eroding competitiveness and driving broader domestic price inflation in early 2026.

Valid Evidence & Official Documentation Links

- [National Audit Office Special Audit Report on Coal Procurement \(April 2026\)](#)

- Official Special Audit Report issued by the Auditor General following COPE directive, detailing the unlicensed Indonesian testing lab (PT Mitra SK Analisa Testama

Samarinda), the registration bypass of Trident Chemphar Ltd, and the 12 certified substandard shipments.

- [The Morning Expose on the Substandard Coal Audit \(Rs. 2,237.7 Million Loss\)](#)
 - Comprehensive investigation detailing the Rs. 2,237.7 million direct thermodynamic loss, 40-day procurement lapses, and boiler damage at the Lakvijaya Power Plant.
- [Auditor General's Department - Lanka Coal Company Audit Reports](#)
 - Official financial audit records documenting procurement non-compliances, penalty disputes, and state bank loan guarantees issued for LCC coal purchases.



5. Systemic Dollar Smuggling via Import Loopholes (Trade Mis-invoicing)

- **Entities & Key Individuals Involved:**
 - Import/Export Commercial Cartels
 - Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL Exchange Control Department)
 - Sri Lanka Customs Department
 - Commercial Banks Trade Finance Divisions
 - Global Financial Integrity (GFI - Monitoring Body)

- **Deep Dive into the Incident:** Commercial import and export cartels exploited systemic regulatory loopholes between commercial bank trade divisions and customs inspection frameworks. Importers routinely engaged in trade mis-invoicing specifically over-invoicing imports of heavy machinery, industrial equipment, and basic goods to secure disproportionately high US dollar allocations from the central treasury at official bank rates. The excess foreign currency was never used for capital goods; instead, it was permanently siphoned into offshore shell accounts in tax havens. Similarly, exporters engaged in under-invoicing, retaining foreign currency revenues in offshore accounts rather than repatriating earnings to Sri Lanka. Because outdated financial legislation treated trade mis-invoicing as a minor civil regulatory violation rather than a non-bailable financial crime, offender syndicates operated with impunity.
- **Governance Failure:** Lack of digital integration between Sri Lanka Customs and the banking sector, inadequate trade surveillance systems, obsolete financial regulations, and weak criminal penalties for capital flight.
- **Transmission & 2025–2026 Economic Impact:**
 - **Severe Foreign Exchange Reserve Exhaustion:** Systematic trade mis-invoicing and unreturned export proceeds drained liquid US dollar reserves from the Central Bank.
 - **Persistent Rupee Depreciation & Imported Cost Pressure:** The artificial scarcity of foreign currency in formal banking channels placed continuous downward pressure on the Sri Lankan Rupee (LKR). In 2025–2026, this depreciation raised the retail cost of imported essential items, fuels, raw materials, and medicine, fueling persistent consumer inflation and constraining monetary policy stabilization.

Valid Evidence & Official Documentation Links

- [Global Financial Integrity \(GFI\) Report on Trade-Related Illicit Financial Flows](#)
 - Comprehensive global study documenting trade mis-invoicing mechanisms, value gaps, and capital flight from developing economies including Sri Lanka.
- [Central Bank of Sri Lanka - Foreign Exchange Act Guidelines](#)
 - Official CBSL Department of Foreign Exchange regulatory directives tracking repatriation enforcement and foreign currency allocation mechanisms for import letters of credit (LCs).
- [Verité Research Study on Trade-Based Money Laundering & Mis-invoicing](#)
 - Empirical analysis examining the institutional weaknesses in Sri Lanka's customs-banking verification channels that permit illicit capital flight.

6. The \$2.5 Million Treasury Cyber-Theft (2025–2026)

- **Entities & Key Individuals Involved:**

- Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
- Department of External Resources (ERD / General Treasury)
- Parliamentary Committee on Public Finance (COPF - Chaired by Dr. Harsha de Silva)
- Treasury Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma
- Export Finance Australia (Creditor)
- Central Bank of Sri Lanka (Financial Intelligence Unit)

- **Deep Dive into the Incident:**

Between late 2025 and January 2026, hackers executed a Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack by infiltrating the server systems of the External Resources Department (ERD) within the Treasury. The cybercriminals intercepted communications related to bilateral debt service payments post-restructuring, impersonated the credit agency Export Finance Australia, and provided altered bank routing details. Treasury officials processed five payment tranches totaling \$2.5 million via unverified email channels into offshore hacker-controlled accounts. The heist was only discovered in early 2026 when a subsequent attempt to intercept a payment due to an Indian creditor raised suspicions, prompting a retroactive audit that revealed the missing Australian debt funds. COPF investigations revealed that the Treasury operated outdated Microsoft Exchange Servers whose support had expired and lacked basic safeguards like Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).

- **Governance Failure:**


Severe negligence in public financial management, failure to maintain basic cybersecurity infrastructure, reliance on unverified email domains for sovereign payments, and absence of dual-authorization safeguards.

- **Transmission & 2025–2026 Economic Impact:**

- **Risk of Technical Sovereign Default:** Because the diverted funds failed to reach Export Finance Australia, it raised serious legal questions in early 2026 over whether non-receipt constituted a technical default under sovereign debt restructuring terms. The Treasury had to engage in high-level diplomatic damage control to demonstrate "good faith" and avert a loan default declaration.
- **Damage to Global Financial Credibility & Investor Freeze:** Exposing structural vulnerabilities at the heart of state treasury operations eroded foreign investor confidence. The institutional breach signaled high cyber risk, freezing foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows at a time when capital was critically required for macroeconomic stabilization.

Valid Evidence & Official Documentation Links

- [Economy Next Financial Report - Treasury Cyber Heist Investigation](#)
 - Comprehensive report covering Treasury Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma's statements on technical default risks, diplomatic engagement with the Australian Embassy, and law enforcement probes.
- [COPF Parliamentary Investigation Report Findings \(The Island\)](#)
 - Parliamentary coverage detailing Committee on Public Finance (COPF) Chairman Dr. Harsha de Silva's presentation on outdated Treasury Exchange servers, absence of MFA, and multi-agency failure.
- [Official Ministry of Finance Confirmation & System Breach Probe \(News 1st\)](#)
 - Official government statement confirming the \$2.5 million diversion, suspensions of Treasury officials, and referrals to the CID and Central Bank FIU.



7. The EV Permit Abuse Scheme

- **Entities & Key Individuals Involved:**
 - Ministry of Labor and Foreign Employment (under former Minister Manusha Nanayakkara)
 - Department of Motor Traffic (DMT) & Sri Lanka Customs
 - Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) & National Audit Office (NAO / Auditor General W.P.C. Wickramaratne)

- Luxury Vehicle Importers & Private Dealers (e.g., Overland Automobiles Ltd.)

- **Deep Dive into the Incident:**

In May 2022, the government introduced a tax-incentive scheme allowing Sri Lankan migrant workers to import fully electric vehicles (EVs) duty-free or under reduced tax bands if they remitted foreign currency back to Sri Lanka via official banking channels. However, investigations and audits by COPA and the NAO revealed massive structural abuse:

- Out of 1,077 permits issued, **over 1,000 permits were exploited or misused** through illicit middlemen and car cartels who bought permit rights from low-income workers for small cash sums.
- The Auditor General flagged potential **money laundering and tax evasion**, revealing that individuals who stayed abroad for as little as 3 days to 3 months and even 4 individuals who had never left Sri Lanka were illegally granted permits.
- Furthermore, raising the luxury tax exemption threshold from Rs. 6 million to Rs. 12 million for these imported EVs enabled local wealthy buyers to import high-end luxury vehicles (including BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, and Tesla fleets) duty-free without generating new foreign currency for the formal economy.

- **Governance Failure:**

Flawed design of executive incentive schemes, absence of verification mechanisms between the Labor Ministry and Sri Lanka Customs, lack of minimum overseas employment criteria, and weak money-laundering controls.

- **Transmission & 2025–2026 Economic Impact:**

- **Direct Tax Revenue Loss:** COPA confirmed a direct loss to state coffers of **Rs. 2.42 billion** due to the arbitrary increase in the luxury tax threshold alone, alongside additional customs duty evasion. This uncollected revenue widened the national fiscal deficit, undermining state revenue goals under the IMF agreement.
- **Diversion of Formal Remittances & Foreign Exchange Drain:** Because cartels used hawala/Undiyal shadow channels to pay off workers or recycle existing domestic dollars to purchase EV permits, the scheme failed to generate sustainable net foreign exchange inflows. Instead, it starved the Central Bank of official remittance growth, contributing to volatile reserve levels and prolonged pressure on the Sri Lankan Rupee (LKR).

Valid Evidence & Official Documentation Links

- [COPA Parliamentary Report & Rs. 2.42 Billion Tax Loss Revelation \(Newswire\)](#)

- Official COPA report details on money laundering suspicions, 1,077 issued permits, 4 non-resident permit holders, and the Rs. 2.42 billion tax loss.
- [National Audit Office \(NAO\) Special Investigation Report \(The Island\)](#)
 - Findings by Auditor General W.P.C. Wickramaratne confirming that ~1,000 permits issued under the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration were misused.
- [Sri Lanka Customs Probe & Overland Automobiles Ltd. Import Investigation \(The Sunday Morning\)](#)
 - Detailed customs investigation into 119 luxury vehicles (BMW, Mercedes, Porsche, Tesla) imported under the pretext of migrant worker EV permits.



8. Luxury Vehicle Customs Fraud

- **Entities & Key Individuals Involved:**
 - Sri Lanka Customs Officers (including corrupted appraisal and examination division officers)
 - Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC)
 - Department of Motor Traffic (DMT) Officials
 - Vehicle Import Cartels and Customs House Agents (CHAs)

- **Deep Dive into the Incident:** To evade Sri Lanka's steep import tariffs on fully assembled automobiles (which often range from 100% to 300%+), import cartels colluded with corrupt customs officials and DMT data entry operators:
 - Importers brought in entire fleets of luxury vehicles (SUVs, sports cars, and luxury sedans) by falsifying bills of landing and cargo manifests to declare them as "cheap industrial spare parts," "machinery components," or "dismantled agricultural equipment."
 - CIABOC investigations submitted to the Colombo Magistrate's Court revealed that cartels manipulated Sri Lanka Customs' ASYCUDA computer databases, deleting crucial entry records or falsely registering luxury vehicles under chassis codes meant for low-value motorcycles and three-wheelers.
 - The vehicles were then registered illegally across regional DMT branches (such as Badulla, Wariyapola, Balangoda, and Wattala) without paying required customs duties or obtaining valid import clearance.
- **Governance Failure:** Institutional corruption, lack of automated container scanning equipment (with Customs physically inspecting only 40% of risk-profiled containers), database tampering, and collusion between border control and vehicle registration authorities.
- **Transmission & 2025–2026 Economic Impact:**
 - **Billions in Tax Revenue Loss:** Systemic duty evasion defrauded state coffers of billions of rupees in uncollected direct customs revenue, widening the national fiscal deficit and undermining revenue targets set by the Treasury.
 - **Shift to Regressive Consumer Taxation (VAT):** To offset these uncollected direct trade revenues and satisfy IMF fiscal benchmarks in 2025–2026, the government maintained high indirect consumption taxes (such as the 18% Value-Added Tax on basic groceries and essential goods), effectively shifting the tax burden from wealthy luxury car owners onto lower-income households.

Valid Evidence & Official Documentation Links

- [CIABOC Court Filings & Luxury Vehicle Confiscation Orders \(The Sunday Morning\)](#)
 - Details CIABOC investigations presented to the Colombo Magistrate's Court regarding manipulated Customs computer data, chassis registration fraud, and the confiscation of illegally imported luxury fleets.
- [CIABOC Direct Enforcement & DMT Illegal Vehicle Registration Arrests \(Newswire\)](#)
 - Details the arrest and prosecution of suspects involved in bypassing Sri Lanka Customs clearance and corruptly registering vehicles through DMT database manipulation.

- [Sri Lanka Customs Official Press Briefing on Import Duty Fraud & Undervaluation \(Daily Mirror\)](#)
 - Official statements by Sri Lanka Customs regarding widespread duty evasion, third-country LCs, under-valuation fraud, and enforcement actions to safeguard state revenue.

Customs defend halt on cross-border LC vehicle imports, cites widespread duty fraud

27 Jun 2025 245 

- Sri Lanka customs collected Rs.200 billion in taxes from vehicle imports so far
- **"The majority, not all, use a third country to under-value the vehicle and commit duty fraud,"**
- Our customs duty revenue target for this year is 2,115 billion rupees

By Nishel Fernando

Sri Lanka Customs yesterday defended its recent decision to halt the clearance of vehicles imported under cross-border Letters of Credit (LCs), citing the measure as a crucial step to combat significant tax evasion through fraudulent under-valuation. Responding to a Daily Mirror story published Wednesday which highlighted the plight of importers with hundreds of vehicles stranded at the port, Customs officials clarified that the move enforces existing regulations to prevent the loss of billions in state revenue. At a press conference held in Colombo, Additional Director of Customs Seevali Arukgoda explained that a surge in irregularities was detected after vehicle imports resumed this year. He stated that the majority of importers were using LCs opened in a third country, such as Singapore or Dubai, for vehicles originating from manufacturing hubs like Japan; specifically to declare a purchase price lower than the actual value. "The majority, not all, use a third country to under-value the vehicle and commit duty fraud," Arukgoda said. "If you open the LC from Japan, you have to state the actual purchase price." The enforcement action hinges on a regulation in the Imports and Exports (Control) Act which requires import documents, including the Pre-Shipment Inspection Certificate and de-registration papers, to be endorsed by a bank in the exporting country. "This means if a vehicle is coming from Japan, even if the LC is from Singapore, the documents must be endorsed

9. The IMF-Forced Legal Overhauls (2023–2026)

- **Entities & Key Individuals Involved:**
 - International Monetary Fund (IMF Mission Team & Executive Board)
 - Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL)
 - Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC)
 - Sri Lankan Parliament & Ministry of Justice
 - Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL & Civil Society Consultative Bodies)
- **Deep Dive into the Incident:**

Following the 2022 macroeconomic collapse, the IMF conducted its first-ever Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA) in Asia on Sri Lanka, revealing that the crisis was rooted in systemic, unpunished governance failures and structural legislative loopholes. Under outdated statutes, state-level corruption, policy-driven embezzlement, and unbacked money printing carried minimal criminal penalties. To secure the \$3 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF), the IMF mandated strict, binding structural benchmarks. Parliament was forced to enact major reform laws:

- **Central Bank Act No. 16 of 2023:** Stripped politicians of the ability to force money printing (monetary financing of budget deficits).

- **Anti-Corruption Act No. 9 of 2023:** Strengthened CIABOC's powers, mandated public asset declarations for high-level officials, and criminalized state-level financial crimes.
- **Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) & Asset Recovery Frameworks (2024–2026):** Implemented strict rules for state debt management and procurement.

However, political resistance, administrative delays in issuing implementation guidelines, and slow progress on key commitments (such as establishing a centralized Beneficial Ownership Registry) caused significant friction during governance reviews.

- **Governance Failure:**

Decades of political resistance to anti-corruption safeguards, lack of statutory transparency in public financial management, and deliberate delays by executive bodies in operationalizing legislative reforms.

- **Transmission & 2025–2026 Economic Impact:**

- **Tranche Delays & Fiscal Tightrope:** Delays in satisfying structural governance benchmarks under the Government Action Plan repeatedly delayed IMF review approvals and disbursement tranches. The threat of delayed financing forced the government to maintain elevated austerity measures, including high corporate and personal income tax bands, to meet primary balance targets.
- **Constrained Private Sector Recovery:** Because the rollout of anti-corruption oversight dragged into 2025–2026, foreign direct investors remained cautious. Domestic businesses faced prolonged periods of tight credit, high interest rates, and subdued consumer demand while the state worked to fulfill its structural benchmarks to unlock international funding.

Valid Evidence & Official Documentation Links

- [IMF Technical Assistance Report: Sri Lanka Governance Diagnostic Assessment \(Sept 2023\)](#)
 - The official landmark diagnostic report by the IMF detailing systemic corruption vulnerabilities across public financial management, state-owned enterprises, tax administration, and central bank governance.
- [Transparency International Sri Lanka \(TISL\) Government Action Plan Tracker](#)
 - Official tracking portal monitoring Sri Lanka's progress against the 2023 IMF Governance Diagnostic recommendations, including status updates on the Anti-Corruption Act, asset declarations, and state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms through 2025–2026.

- [IMF Country Report & Extended Fund Facility Reviews \(May 2026\)](#)
 - Official IMF press release and country documentation covering the combined Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the EFF, confirming progress, structural benchmark performance, and the fiscal policy commitments required for 2026.



Ditwah

1. Infrastructure and Utilities (\$1.735 Billion Damage)

The heavy rains and large floods from Cyclone Ditwah broke Sri Lanka's public systems. This sector took the biggest hit, making up **\$1.735 billion** in direct physical damage, which is almost half of all the losses on the island. The floods covered **more than 16,000 kilometers of roads** and broke or washed away **480 bridges**. Trains stopped working because water and mud covered **278 kilometers of train tracks** and broke 35 train bridges. This left most of the country's train system unable to run.

At the same time, power and water systems stopped working. Big poles that carry electricity fell down in the strong floods. This took away electricity from **3.9 million homes and businesses**, which is more than half of the country. It also broke **16,771 power transformers**. This massive utility collapse cost the

Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) **Rs. 20 billion (roughly \$64 million)** in direct repair expenses. More than 150 city water systems were ruined by dirty floodwater, cutting off clean drinking water for millions of people.

Furthermore, the loss of power and broken roads cut off phone and internet signals in many towns for several days. Because communication lines were down, families could not call for help, and rescue teams could not talk to each other easily. This damage made it very difficult to transport food, clean water, and emergency medicine to small villages, forcing workers to use boats and helicopters to distribute life-saving supplies.

2. Housing and Social Infrastructure (\$985 Million Damage)

The storm also caused a lot of damage to buildings, costing **\$985 million** in direct structural losses. The floods and strong winds hit **nearly 720,000 buildings**. Records show that **129,435 homes were damaged**. This includes **6,121 houses that were completely destroyed** and fell down, and **114,314 homes that were partly broken**. This created a huge problem because **233,000 people had to leave their homes** to stay in government shelters.

The storm also hit important places that help people every day. The water damaged **243 public hospitals and small clinics**. This made it very hard for sick people to get medical help when they needed it most. Hundreds of schools were also broken, including 159 schools in the Central area alone. This stopped children from going to class. In addition, **764 religious and historical places** were damaged by the mudslides and rising river waters.

Because so many people lost their homes at once, temporary government shelters became very crowded and ran out of space quickly. Families did not just lose their roofs and walls; the fast-moving waters also washed away all their clothes, beds, cooking tools, and important personal papers like identity cards and schoolbooks. This loss has left thousands of displaced citizens completely dependent on emergency aid from charities and international groups just to survive each day.

3. Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food Security (\$814 Million Damage)

Farms and food sources suffered a huge **\$814 million loss**, which made it hard for people to find enough food to buy. The heavy rains flooded **1.1 million hectares of land**, which is about one-fifth of the whole country. The storm also caused **1,200 mudslides** that tore through farming valleys. The floods destroyed **more than 600,000 acres of food crops**. This included a lot of the main rice fields. In areas like Nuwara Eliya, vegetable crops were completely ruined. This meant there was less food in the markets, and prices went up very fast.

People who raise animals or fish also lose everything. The country lost **3 million chickens**, which meant fewer eggs and less meat for markets and bakeries. Along the coast, the fishing areas lost a lot of money. The waves and floods completely destroyed **more than 600 shrimp farms in Puttalam**. The storm also

broke or washed away hundreds of small fishing boats and nets, causing losses exceeding **Rs. 20 billion** for the aquaculture and fisheries sectors.


To stop people from going hungry, Sri Lanka has been forced to buy rice and vegetables from other countries very quickly. This emergency food import is costing a lot of money that the government did not plan to spend, which makes the country's financial situation worse. Even worse, the heavy floods washed away the seeds that poor farmers were saving to plant for the next season, meaning it will take many months for local food production to return to normal. [1, 2]

4. Commerce, Manufacturing, and MSMEs (\$562 Million Damage)

Shops, businesses, and factories suffered **\$562 million in damage**. This stopped people from working and making money. The storm hurt **more than 45,000 active businesses**. In this group, **29,600 small and medium-sized shops** reported heavy damage. Their workshops, storage rooms, and sellable goods were ruined by water. These small shops are very important because they give jobs to local people in small towns.

Big factories that make goods to sell to other countries were also hit hard. Floods and power cuts stopped **685 clothing factories** in the Western area from working. They could not finish making clothes on time for global brands, which delayed shipping. At the same time, hotels and tourist spots have lost a lot of money. The storm hit right when winter holidays started. Many travelers canceled their trips, which hurt the tourism business: a sector that had generated over **\$3.1 billion** in revenue just the year before.

This sudden halt in business caused a major income crisis for everyday workers. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the total loss in household wages reached up to **\$48 million per month**. At the same time, thousands of small shop owners are trapped in heavy debt because the goods they bought with bank loans were completely ruined by floodwater. With no shops left to open and no items to sell, these owners cannot pay back their loans, creating a serious problem for local banks across the country.




The Middle East War & Shipping Crisis

In late February 2026, a sharp escalation in military conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran severely disrupted critical maritime trade routes in the Middle East. Key global transit points (specifically the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz) were rendered in high-risk zones almost overnight. In response to safety concerns and escalating war-risk insurance costs, major international shipping companies suspended regular transit through these routes. Cargo ships were forced to detour around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa, adding 10 to 14 days to standard voyages and significantly driving up global freight costs between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

The immediate trigger for this case was the joint US-Israeli military operation against Iran launched on 28 February 2026. Within days, at least fifteen containerships had reversed course or diverted away from the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most critical oil chokepoints. Major carriers, including CMA CGM and Hapag-Lloyd, ordered vessels in or bound for the Middle East Gulf to take shelter and suspended Suez Canal transits until further notice, citing the waterway's effective closure by relevant authorities amid the deteriorating security situation.

This was not an isolated shock. It landed on top of an already-disrupted shipping system: the Red Sea crisis that began in November 2023, when Houthi forces started attacking commercial vessels linked to Israel, had already forced a large share of Asia-Europe container traffic around the Cape of Good Hope. A fragile, partial return to the Suez route in late 2025 was reversed almost overnight once the Iran war began. By late March 2026, the Houthis had resumed direct attacks on Israel, and maritime security advisories kept the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at a persistently elevated threat level through the following months.

The practical consequences for global shipping are large and quantifiable. Rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope adds roughly ten to fourteen days to a voyage. Asia-to-Europe freight rates have risen 25 to 40 percent above pre-crisis levels, and Asia-to-US East Coast rates are 15 to 25 percent higher, with a similar extension in transit time. Between five and seven percent of global container shipping capacity has effectively been absorbed simply by ships sailing longer routes, tightening capacity even on trade lanes that never touch the Red Sea. For ships that continue to sail through the region, war risk insurance adds an extra 0.5% - 1.0% of cargo value, payable in addition to standard freight rates.



Economic impact on Sri Lanka

Positive impact on Sri Lanka

Even though the war in the Middle East created serious problems worldwide, Sri Lanka benefited from a business perspective. Because Sri Lanka sits right in the middle of major sea routes in the Indian Ocean, ships avoiding dangerous areas started coming to Sri Lankan ports instead, turning the island into a major shipping center.

Normally, large container ships traveling between Asia and Europe stop at ports in the Middle East to drop off cargo. When war made those ports too risky, the ships began using the Port of Colombo as their primary stopping point. Massive ships dropped off thousands of containers in Colombo, and smaller boats picked them up to transport them to neighboring countries like India and Bangladesh. This process called transshipment increased Colombo's port business by over 20%.

Ships pay fees every time they dock at a port covering parking, loading, unloading, and refueling. Because hundreds of extra vessels had to stop in Sri Lanka, the country received a strong inflow of foreign currency (US Dollars). This extra income provided much-needed financial stability to the Sri Lankan government during a critical time.

International observers had previously questioned whether Sri Lanka's ports could handle the world's biggest container ships efficiently without delays. The sudden surge of traffic tested the country's port infrastructure. Sri Lanka's newest harbor terminals performed effectively under high pressure, proving that Colombo is one of the safest and most capable shipping hubs in Asia.

Also, Hambantota Port, located on Sri Lanka's southern coast, recorded its highest volume of business in history. Ships dodging active war zones redirected their cargo directly to Hambantota. To keep up with this heavy demand, the port invested more than \$100 million to expand its container yards and purchase new cargo cranes.

As a large volume of ships traveled past southern Sri Lanka, local support businesses experienced rapid growth. Companies offering ship refueling (bunkering), mechanical repair services, food and water supplies for ship crews, and crew exchange services recorded their highest profits.

The image shows a screenshot of a news article from 'News 1st' with the headline 'Colombo Port Revenue Surges 20% Amid Middle East Conflict Disruptions'. The article, dated 26.05.2023 11:33 AM, reports that Colombo Port has recorded a 20 percent increase in operational revenue compared to April last year, as shifting global shipping patterns drive more activity towards Sri Lanka's main maritime gateway. It quotes Deputy Minister of Ports and Aviation, Ruwan Kodituwakku, stating that the surge is due to congestion and operational constraints in Middle Eastern ports forcing shipping lines to reroute transshipment activities, resulting in a significant inflow of cargo through Colombo Port. This has contributed to a surge in both operational capacity utilization and revenue generation. The article also notes that transshipment volumes, already a dominant component of port operations, have seen a notable expansion, with overall activity rising by approximately 20 percent when compared not only to April 2023 but also to the preceding month of March. The Deputy Minister expressed confidence that the upward trend would continue in the coming months, given that tensions in the Middle East show no immediate signs of easing. The article mentions that transshipment accounts for around 80 percent of cargo handled at Colombo Port.



Petroleum products typically account for close to 20 percent of Sri Lanka's total import bill, so even a moderate spike in benchmark oil prices has an outsized effect on the trade account. Economists have

warned that if oil prices sustain near USD 120 per barrel, the annual fuel import bill could swell to an unaffordable USD 4.5 to 5 billion, a level that risks triggering a fresh balance-of-payments crisis.

Exhibit 2: Fuel Import Expenditure, 2026

Month (2026)	Fuel Import Value (USD million)	Year-on-Year Change
March	630	+74.7%
April	886	+149.9%

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, External Sector Performance reports, March and April 2026.



The impact of the war in the Middle East was reflected in the performance of the External Sector in April 2026 as well. The external current account recorded a deficit in April 2026 compared to the surplus recorded during January through March 2026. This was mainly driven by the widened trade deficit, a moderation in the services surplus, and higher primary income account deficit, despite an increase in workers' remittances compared to a year earlier. Consequently, the external current account recorded a marginal deficit during January to April 2026.

The merchandise trade deficit widened in April 2026, reflecting stronger growth in imports relative to exports. Further, during January–April 2026, the trade deficit widened to US\$ 3.7 billion, compared to US\$ 2.3 billion in the corresponding period of 2025.

remittances compared to a year earlier. Consequently, the external current account recorded a marginal deficit during January to April 2026.

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Expenditure on fuel imports increased notably by 149.9% on a year-on-year basis to US\$ 886 million in April 2026, driven by the surge in fuel prices in the global markets amid the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and higher import volumes.

Expenditure on motor vehicle imports, including both personal and commercial vehicles, amounted to US\$ 208 million in April 2026, bringing total expenditure on motor vehicle imports to US\$ 821 million during January–April 2026.

The terms of trade deteriorated on a year-on-year basis in April 2026, as the increase in import prices exceeded the increase in export prices. Meanwhile, the terms of trade also deteriorated during January–April 2026 compared to the corresponding period of the previous year.

The surplus in the services account declined by 37.8%, year-on-year, to US\$ 229 million in April 2026, primarily due to the reduction in tourist

4.2 Export Sector Under Siege: The Tea Industry

Ceylon tea is Sri Lanka's most globally recognized export, and the Middle East is its single most important regional market. In 2025, Sri Lanka exported approximately 125 million kilograms of tea worth around USD 750 million to the region, with Iraq the largest single buyer. The war has hit this trade directly: tea export earnings fell 17.3 percent year-on-year to USD 114.75 million in March 2026, with shipments to Iraq down 38 percent and shipments to the United Arab Emirates collapsing by 93 percent.

The decline continued into the following months. April 2026 tea export volumes fell to 17.9 million kilograms from 18.2 million kilograms a year earlier, and cumulative exports for January to April 2026 were down 4 percent year-on-year, at 78.3 million kilograms. Exporters report that the strain comes from several directions at once: shipping lines reducing or suspending calls to Middle Eastern ports, sharply higher freight and war-risk insurance costs, currency volatility, and weaker purchasing power among consumers in the affected markets.

One notable adaptive response is worth highlighting for analysis: Türkiye has emerged as a fast-growing destination for Sri Lankan tea, with imports nearly doubling, as traders appear to be using Turkish channels as an alternative route to reach customers who might otherwise have been served directly through Gulf or Iraqi ports. Azerbaijan has shown a similar, smaller increase. This suggests exporters are already adapting their routing and customer base in real time, a theme worth exploring in any recommendations.

Exhibit 3: Sri Lanka Tea Exports to the Middle East, 2026

Indicator	Value	Change
Tea export earnings, March 2026	USD 114.75 million	-17.3% y-o-y
Tea exports to Iraq, March 2026	—	-38% y-o-y
Tea exports to UAE, March 2026	—	-93% y-o-y
Tea export volume, April 2026	17.9 million kg	vs 18.2 million kg (Apr 2025)
Cumulative tea exports, Jan–Apr 2026	78.3 million kg	-4% vs 81.3 million kg (Jan–Apr 2025)
Tea exports to Türkiye	Rising sharply	Nearly doubled y-o-y

Source: Sri Lanka Customs data via Asia Siyaka Research; Reuters, as reported by Newswire.lk, May 2026.



4.3 Remittances: A vulnerable source of foreign exchange

Migrant worker remittances are one of Sri Lanka's largest sources of foreign exchange, and roughly 40 percent of them come from Sri Lankan workers employed in the Middle East. Unexpectedly, remittances have so far strengthened rather than weakened during the crisis: cumulative remittances for January to May 2026 reached USD 3.9 billion, a 26.0 percent increase year-on-year, with growth as high as 32 percent year-on-year in the first two months of the year. This pattern is consistent with prior crises, where migrant workers tend to send more money home, not less, when their families face economic uncertainty.

This strength should not be read as immunity. Analysts caution that if the conflict disrupts formal remittance channels (for example through internet outages, loss of banking access, or rescue) migrant workers may shift toward informal transfer channels that bypass Central Bank and do not count toward official foreign reserves. A modelled scenario in which Middle East remittances fall by 60 percent estimates a loss of approximately USD 2.4 billion in annual foreign exchange earnings for Sri Lanka, a blow that would be difficult to absorb given the country's limited foreign exchange reserves.

Exhibit 4: Workers' Remittances, 2026

Period	Remittances (USD)	Year-on-Year Change
February 2026 (single month)	729 million	vs USD 548.1 million, Feb 2025
January–February 2026 (cumulative)	1.48 billion	+32.0%

Period	Remittances (USD)	Year-on-Year Change
March 2026 (single month)	815 million	+17.5%
January–March 2026 (cumulative)	—	+26.5%
January–May 2026 (cumulative)	3.9 billion	+26.0%

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, External Sector Performance reports (Feb–May 2026); IPS Sri Lanka, Talking Economics, March 2026.

PRESS RELEASE


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இலங்கை மத்திய வங்கி
CENTRAL BANK OF SRI LANKA

Issued By: Economic Research Department
Date: 29 May 2026

External Sector Performance – April 2026




4.4 Tourism and Capital Flows

Tourism is a major and fast-growing source of foreign exchange for Sri Lanka, and the Middle East functions as a key aviation gateway for tourists travelling to the island, particularly via Gulf hub airports. Since the war began, tourist arrivals have weakened and inflationary pressure has intensified, adding a further drag on the services account at the same time that the merchandise trade account is under pressure.

Portfolio capital has also turned cautious. The Colombo Stock Exchange recorded net foreign outflows in several months of 2026 (approximately USD 30 million in February, USD 10 million in March, and USD

23 million in May) while the government securities market recorded net outflows of USD 64 million in March and USD 60 million in May. Sri Lanka's target of attracting USD 1.5 to 2 billion in foreign direct investment for 2026 is now at risk, as global financial volatility pushes international capital toward safe-haven assets rather than frontier and emerging markets.



4.5 Currency Depreciation and Reserve Pressure

The combined effect of a rising import bill and softer export, tourism, and capital inflows have pushed the Sri Lankan rupee into a sustained depreciation. The rupee's year-to-date depreciation against the US dollar widened steadily through the crisis: 1.6 percent by end-March 2026, 2.9 percent by end-April, 5.4 percent by end-May, and 7.9 percent by end-June 2026, with the Central Bank explicitly attributing the trend to external sector pressure arising from the Middle East conflict.

Gross official reserves, which had been rebuilt to a four-year high of USD 7.3 billion by February 2026, began to erode as the crisis progressed, falling to USD 7.0 billion in March, USD 6.8 billion in April, before a modest recovery to USD 6.9 billion in May, supported by the payment of the sixth and seventh installments under the IMF's Extended Fund Facility. The merchandise trade deficit widened sharply across the same period, reaching USD 3.7 billion from January to April 2026, compared with USD 2.3 billion in the same period of 2025. The external current account, which had posted a cumulative surplus of USD 531 million in the first quarter of 2026, turned into a marginal deficit position for the January-to-May period as the trade deficit widened faster than remittance and services inflows could offset it.

Exhibit 5: External Sector Indicators, 2026

Month-end (2026)	Rupee Depreciation (YTD, %)	Gross Official Reserves (USD bn)
February	—	7.3
March	1.6%	7.0
April	2.9%	6.8
May	5.4%	6.9
June	7.9%	—

Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, External Sector Performance reports, February–May 2026.

EXPLAINER - Sri Lanka's fuel price surge and looming cost of living crisis

The Colombo Consumer Price Index (CPI) recorded a significant jump in April 2026, with the index rising by 5.8 points in a single month.

To put this in perspective, this represents an expenditure value increase of 3,340.92 rupees for a standard market basket.

For a family on a fixed salary, finding an extra 5,000 rupees every month just to maintain the same level of consumption is an impossible task.

The result is forced austerity. Families are cutting back on protein-rich foods, delaying medical check-ups, and withdrawing children from extracurricular activities.

The middle class is increasingly falling into the category of working poor, as their disposable income is swallowed by the rising cost of basic mobility and necessities.

4.6 Effect on Ordinary People's Daily Cost of Living

Sri Lanka has a fuel-pricing rule agreed with the IMF that requires prices to reflect real global costs, so when oil becomes more expensive because of the war, that cost reaches the pump almost immediately; the government can't mitigate it for long without breaking its IMF commitments. This played out clearly through 2026: fuel prices rose in repeated rounds, with petrol 92 climbing from around Rs. 293 in late 2025 to over Rs. 434 within a few months, diesel following a similar path, and electricity tariffs rising by as much as 40 percent as energy costs climbed.

These increases don't stay isolated at the fuel pump; they spread through the whole economy. Higher fuel and electricity costs raise transport fares, delivery and logistics costs, and the price of cooking gas and

kerosene, which many lower-income and rural households rely on directly. In April 2026 alone, the Colombo Consumer Price Index jumped enough that an average household needed about Rs. 5,380 more per month just to buy the same basket of everyday goods as before; a jump that is very difficult to absorb on a fixed salary.

For ordinary families, this translates into real, visible hardship rather than an abstract economic statistic: cutting back on protein-rich food, delaying medical checkups, and pulling children out of extracurricular activities are the kinds of trade-offs households are already reporting. This is worth including in the case because it grounds the national-level numbers (reserves, trade deficits, exchange rates) in what the crisis feels like for a typical Sri Lankan family, which is often exactly the kind of connection judges want to see.

Source: Daily Mirror, "Why Are Fuel Prices Rising in Sri Lanka? The 2026 Crisis Explained" (June 2026)

A war 4,000 kilometres away. A rupee under pressure. A decade of price increases. And a State spending Rs. 57 billion to keep your fuel bill from doubling. Below is the full story — explained with data.



By Moha Mustafa

June 3rd (Daily Mirror) - Last morning, if you filled your tank with Petrol 92 at any CEYPETCO station across Sri Lanka, you would have paid Rs. 434 per litre. Twelve weeks ago, you would have paid Rs. 293. In November 2025, you paid Rs. 117.

The number on that board did not happen overnight, and it was not caused by any single decision. It is the result of three forces colliding simultaneously: a decade of structural price changes, a war that emptied the Middle East and cut off a critical global oil route, and a Sri Lankan rupee that has lost over 5% of its value against the US dollar since January 2026.

This article explains all three — with data, with context and without simplification. It also tells the story that rarely makes headlines: that without





4.7 Extra Costs for Sri Lankan Airlines


Sri Lankan Airlines has been directly affected by the airspace closures that followed the war. Its Colombo to London flights (UL 503/504) have been rerouted via Saudi Arabian airspace to avoid restricted zones over Iran and Iraq, adding roughly two hours to journey time in each direction, with no confirmed date for a return to normal routing. Earlier in the crisis, the airline was also forced to ground flights entirely to several Middle Eastern destinations, including Riyadh, Kuwait, Dammam, Dubai, and Doha, as regional airspace closures disrupted flight paths across the network.

This kind of rerouting carries real, measurable costs, not just longer schedules. Avoiding hostile airspace can add 300 to 800 nautical miles to a route and extend flight time by 45 to 120 minutes, forcing airlines to burn significantly more fuel at a time when fuel prices are already elevated. On top of this, airlines are paying an extra \$500 to \$1,200 per sector in overflight fees to the countries whose airspace they now use

instead, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman, which have both seen a surge in traffic as carriers divert south to avoid Iran.

For a national carrier like Sri Lankan Airlines, still financially vulnerable in the years since Sri Lanka's 2022 default, these extra costs are difficult to absorb without consequence. Higher fuel burn added overflight fees, and longer aircraft utilization per route squeeze operating margins directly, and the broader industry expects the combination of higher fuel costs and longer flight paths to push ticket prices upward. This makes aviation a smaller but genuinely additional channel through which the war reaches the Sri Lankan economy, alongside shipping, tea, remittances, and tourism, raising costs for the flag carrier while making Sri Lanka less convenient, and possibly costlier, to fly to at exactly the moment the country needs strong inbound tourism.

Sources: *Wego Travel Blog* (Apr 2026); *Travel and Tour World* (Mar 2026); *AGBI* (Apr 2026); *Simple Flying* (Mar 2026).



<https://unctad.org/publication/strait-hormuz-disruptions-implications-global-trade-and-development>

<https://mykn.kuehne-nagel.com/news/article/tale-of-two-ports-how-the-red-sea-ship-attack-17-May-2024>

The Systemic Paradox: Why the Middle East War & Maritime Crisis Delivered the Ultimate Blow

While internal policy missteps, systemic corruption, and environmental disasters severely weakened Sri Lanka's economic foundation, the Middle East War and Maritime Crisis delivered the definitive, inescapable shock that paralyzed the nation's recovery. Every preceding crisis the country endured whether the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, the COVID-19 pandemic, or the catastrophic 2021 synthetic fertilizer ban was fundamentally localized, sector-specific, or policy-induced. Domestic missteps like unfunded tax cuts, monetary expansion ("money printing"), and illegal Hawala currency drains were self-inflicted wounds that Sri Lanka retained the sovereign jurisdiction to correct through legislative overhauls, IMF-backed tax programs, and exchange rate floats. Even severe natural shocks, such as Cyclone Ditwah's \$1.4 billion in localized destruction, permitted a rapid macro-rebound through post-disaster reconstruction spending. Similarly, the 2019 terrorist attacks decimated tourism revenue but left manufacturing, tea exports, and ocean trade routes completely functional.

The Middle East War and Maritime Crisis, however, operated as a completely unjudgeable, exogenous wall that simultaneously dismantled every pillar of Sri Lanka's Balance of Payments and macroeconomic framework. Unlike previous isolated shocks, this global crisis attacked the nation's foreign exchange accounts from all directions at once. On the import side, forced vessel rerouting around Africa's Cape of Good Hope drove ocean freight rates up by 25% to 40% and triggered a global energy spike, causing monthly fuel import bills to jump by 149.9% year-on-year to \$886 million in April 2026. On the export and revenue side, the conflict directly choked off the Gulf region, the critical source of over 80% of Sri Lanka's \$8+ billion in worker remittances and 25% of its global tea export market. As tea earnings fell sharply, global apparel buyers faced severe logistics delays, and aviation corridors forced Sri Lankan Airlines to burn excess fuel while absorbing \$500 to \$1,200 per sector in overflight fees, the Central Bank was forced to burn through nearly \$900 million in hard currency reserves just to keep basic energy flowing.

What elevates this crisis as the absolute "biggest shot" in the entire case study is the hostile global economic landscape in which it landed. During the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, global interest rates were near zero and crude oil prices collapsed, providing an artificial import bill cushion to Sri Lanka. The 2026 war and shipping shock, by contrast, struck during a climate of elevated global interest rates and high commodity prices, hitting an economy with zero remaining fiscal cushion. The crisis immediately neutralized the state's hard-won primary budget surpluses, depreciated the Rupee by 7.9%, spiked household living costs by LKR 5,380 per month, and forced emergency tariff hikes on local industries. Because it is the only shock in Sri Lanka's history that operates across every macro transmission channel simultaneously spanning energy, shipping, trade, remittances, aviation, and inflation without offering any possibility of internal legislative remedy the Middle East War and Maritime Crisis stands as the ultimate catalyst that sealed the country's economic downfall.

1. Acceleration of Demographic Brain Drain vs. Shipping Crisis & War

- **The Brain Drain Drag:** Over 300,000 skilled professionals (doctors, IT engineers, academics) migrated annually to post-2022. While this shrinks the domestic tax base and creates localized

skill shortages, it yields a direct financial counterweight: **increased worker remittances** (\$8.07 billion in 2025).

- **Why Shipping Crisis & War is Worse:** Brain drain generates foreign exchange inflows that cushion the capital account. Conversely, the Shipping Crisis & War **actively drains FX reserves** by inflating the fuel import bill (by over \$800M+) while simultaneously threatening the regional stability of the very Gulf countries where migrant workers reside.

2. Cyclone Ditwah vs. Shipping Crisis & War

- **The Cyclone Ditwah Impact:** Cyclone Ditwah (Nov 2025) caused **\$1.4 billion in direct damage**, primarily affecting agriculture (106,000+ hectares of paddy land) and rural housing, shaving 0.7% off Q4 2025 GDP.
- **Why Shipping Crisis & War is Worse:** Cyclone Ditwah was a **geographically localized, one-off physical event**. Economic activity rebounded rapidly to 5.1% in Q1 2026 due to post-disaster reconstruction spending. In contrast, the Shipping Crisis & War is a **continuous structural tax on the entire national economy**, raising production and freight costs across every manufacturing and export sector without a physical endpoint.

3. Illegal Activities (Hawala / Undiyal) vs. Shipping Crisis & War

- **The Illegal Market Distortion:** During 2021–2022, informal Hawala/Undiyal channels diverted official remittances away from banks because the central bank maintained an artificial LKR 200/USD peg, draining official reserves.
- **Why Shipping Crisis & War is Worse:** Illegal currency leakage was a **policy-induced market distortion**. Once Sri Lanka floated the Rupee in mid-2022, parallel market premiums vanished, and remittances returned to record levels (\$8.07B). The Shipping Crisis & War cannot be policy-corrected internally; no Central Bank regulatory change can eliminate global ocean freight increases or lower international crude oil spot prices.

4. Governance Issues (2019 Tax Cuts & Fertilizer Ban) vs. Shipping Crisis & War

- **The Governance Baseline:** Domestic policy errors (2019 unfunded tax cuts losing LKR 600B+ in revenue and the overnight 2021 synthetic fertilizer ban) triggered the 2022 debt default.
- **Why Shipping Crisis & War is Worse in the Current Horizon:** Governance failures represent the *root structural cause* of the 2022 bankruptcy, but they are **correctable through institutional reforms**. Under IMF-mandated fiscal consolidation (18% VAT, utility cost reflective pricing), Sri Lanka restored primary surpluses and rebuilt reserves to \$6.4B+. However, the Shipping Crisis &

War acts as an **exogenous macroeconomic wall** that directly neutralizes these hard-won domestic policy gains by forcing emergency reserve drawdowns to fund inflated energy bills.

5. Collapse in Remittance Inflow vs. Shipping Crisis & War

- **The Remittance Drop (2021):** Official remittances collapsed to \$3.8 billion in 2021 due to exchange rate manipulation.
- **Why Shipping Crisis & War is Worse:** The 2021 remittance collapse affected a single inflow channel and was fully restored once market rates normalized. The Shipping Crisis & War attacks **both sides of the foreign exchange ledger simultaneously**: it inflates import expenditure (fuel and freight) while placing the primary source of remittance generation (GCC nations) under geopolitical threat.

6. COVID-19 Pandemic vs. Shipping Crisis & War

- **The COVID-19 Shock:** COVID-19 wiped out tourism receipts (\$4.4B annual loss) and locked down local industries during 2020–2021.
- **Why Shipping Crisis & War is Worse for Recovery:** During COVID-19, global interest rates were near zero and global oil prices collapsed (even dipping into negative territory briefly in 2020), which kept Sri Lanka's import bill artificially low. The Shipping Crisis & War strikes in a **high global interest rate environment with elevated energy costs**, compounding imported cost-push inflation when Sri Lanka has zero fiscal space left to cushion citizens.


7. 2019 Easter Sunday Bomb Blasts vs. Shipping Crisis & War

- **The Bomb Blast Shock:** Coordinated hotel and church attacks killed over 260 people and halted tourism, costing an estimated **\$1.5 billion in foreign exchange** in 2019.
- **Why Shipping Crisis & War is Worse:** The Easter attacks hit a **single specific sector (tourism and hospitality)**, leaving manufacturing, tea exports, and maritime trade operational. The Shipping Crisis & War affects **every single physical trade sector** in the island from apparel fabric imports to tea exports to domestic thermal electricity generation making its systemic reach far wider.

Concluding Verdict

Domestic governance failures and historical crises created the debt crisis of 2022. However, in the context of Sri Lanka's economic stabilization, the **Shipping Crisis and Regional War (Category 6) stand out as the most damaging economic factors**. It is the only shock that operates across all macro transmission

channels simultaneously raising imported fuel costs, inflating maritime logistics expenses, compressing export margins, and threatening foreign exchange reserves without being subject to domestic policy remedies.



What are the corrective actions done by the government


Fiscal Consolidation & Tax Architecture Reconstruction

Sri Lanka's 2022 economic collapse was fundamentally a fiscal crisis: state revenues had plummeted to an unsustainable **8% of GDP** due to broad tax cuts, creating massive budget deficits financed by debt and money creation. Restructuring this system required rebuilding the country's tax base, modernizing tax collection, and locking in legal rules to enforce fiscal discipline.

1. Tax Policy & Base Expansion

The government executed a series of structural tax reforms designed to rapidly raise state revenue to over **15% of GDP**:

- **Standardized 18% Value-Added Tax (VAT):** The general VAT rate was elevated to **18%**, and previously exempt categories including fuel, commercial electricity, and over 90 consumer and industrial goods were integrated into the tax net.
- **Lowering VAT Registration Thresholds:** To bring small-to-medium enterprises into the formal economy, the annual turnover threshold for VAT and Social Security Contribution Levy (SSCL) registration was lowered from **LKR 60 million to LKR 36 million**.
- **Personal & Corporate Income Tax Reform:** Tax brackets were recalibrated, lowering personal income tax thresholds and raising corporate tax rates to a standardized 30% across sectors, while raising PAYE tax relief thresholds for salaried professionals to balance equity.



2. Digital Enforcement & Revenue Administration (RAMIS II)

Tax evasion and administrative corruption were addressed by digitizing revenue collection and replacing paper-based processes:

- **Operationalization of RAMIS II:** The Inland Revenue Department (IRD) fully deployed the **Revenue Administration Management Information System (RAMIS II)**, making online e-filing and digital payments mandatory for corporate taxpayers and registered individuals.
- **Cross-Database Data Matching:** RAMIS II integrates data from the Department of Motor Traffic, land registries, customs, and commercial bank accounts to automatically flag wealth mismatches and unreported income.

- **Replacement of Simplified VAT (SVAT):** SVAT was replaced with an automated digital VAT refund system. This eliminated physical refund checks and manual IRD approvals, removing opportunities for bribery and reducing compliance costs for exporters.

3. Legislative Framework: Public Financial Management (PFM) Act

To prevent future administrations from overspending, Parliament passed the **Public Financial Management (PFM) Act**, establishing statutory fiscal guardrails:

- **Mandatory Primary Surplus Targets:** The law legally requires the government to maintain a primary budget surplus (government revenue minus non-interest expenditure) of **at least 2.3% to 2.5% of GDP**.
- **Public Debt Caps:** It sets a binding target to lower the national public-debt-to-GDP ratio to **95% by 2031**.
- **Restrictions on Guarantees:** Strict statutory caps were placed on issuing Treasury guarantees to state-owned enterprises, preventing off-balance-sheet debt accumulation.



4. Real-World Outcomes & Evidence

Fiscal Metric	Pre-Reform Crisis (2022)	Post-Reform Performance
Tax Revenue to GDP	7.3%	14.2% – 16.6%
Primary Balance	-5.7% (Deficit)	+5.4% Surplus (Historic High)
Budget Position	Unfunded widening gap	Rs. 197.4B Mid-Year Budget Surplus

- **2025 Primary Surplus Outperformance:** Sri Lanka recorded a historic **5.4% primary surplus** (LKR 1,755.8 billion), far exceeding the 2.3% target set under the IMF Extended Fund Facility.
- **Revenue-Driven Growth:** Rather than relying solely on capital spending cuts, **75%+ of capital expenditure was utilized**, proving that primary surplus gains were driven by actual revenue growth (+25.9% year-on-year tax revenue surge).

Monetary Autonomy & Ban on "Money Printing"

Between 2020 and 2022, direct monetary financing commonly referred to as "money printing" was heavily relied upon to fund Sri Lanka's budget deficits. The Central Bank purchased primary issuances of Treasury bills directly from the Treasury. This expansion of the net domestic assets of the Central Bank swelled the LKR monetary base, triggering severe hyperinflation (peaking at **69.8%** in late 2022) and rapidly depreciating the Sri Lankan Rupee.

To permanently fix this structural weakness, Sri Lanka completely redesigned its monetary framework through legislative reform, institutional independence, and operational modernization.

1. Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) Act No. 16 of 2023

Passed by Parliament in September 2023, the **Central Bank of Sri Lanka Act No. 16 of 2023** repealed the legacy Monetary Law Act of 1949 and established a modern, politically independent central bank.

- **Statutory Independence:** The CBSL was granted full administrative, functional, and financial autonomy from the Ministry of Finance. The Treasury Secretary was removed from the decision-making governing bodies to prevent political pressure on monetary decisions.
- **Prohibition of Direct Monetary Financing: Section 43** of the Act explicitly prohibits the CBSL from purchasing government securities in the primary market (banning primary-market T-bill purchases). The government can no longer require the Central Bank to create money to cover fiscal shortfalls.
- **Single Primary Objective:** Domestic price stability replaced previous vague mandates, compelling the bank to prioritize keeping inflation low and predictable over short-term stimulus.

2. Flexible Inflation Targeting (FIT) Framework

Under the Monetary Policy Framework Agreement signed between the Minister of Finance and the CBSL, Sri Lanka formally transitioned to a **Flexible Inflation Targeting (FIT)** regime:

- **The 5% Inflation Target:** The Central Bank is legally bound to anchor headline consumer inflation (measured by the Colombo Consumer Price Index, CCPI) at **5.0%** with a tolerance band of ± 2 percentage points.
- **Parliamentary Accountability:** If headline inflation strays outside the target range ($< 3\%$ or $> 7\%$) for two consecutive quarters, the CBSL Governor must issue an open report to Parliament explaining the deviation, outlining corrective measures, and setting an expected timeframe for recovery.

3. Transition to Single Policy Interest Rate Mechanism

To enhance policy signals and eliminate market confusion, CBSL overhauled its operating mechanics:

- **Overnight Policy Rate (OPR):** CBSL introduced a streamlined **Overnight Policy Rate (OPR)** as its primary policy interest rate.
- **Standing Facilities Corridor:** The legacy Standing Deposit Facility Rate (SDFR) and Standing Lending Facility Rate (SLFR) were linked directly to the OPR with a set margin, creating an official interest rate corridor.
- **Operating Target:** The **Average Weighted Call Money Rate (AWCMR)** serves as the operational day-to-day target, controlled using Open Market Operations (OMOs).

4. Real-World Outcomes & Evidence

Monetary Indicator	Pre-Reform Crisis (2022)	Post-Reform Level
Monetary Financing ("Money Printing")	Hundreds of Billions in Primary T-Bills	Zero Primary Purchases (By Law)
Headline Inflation (CCPI)	Peak 69.8% (Hyperinflation)	Anchored near 5.0% Target
Policy Mechanism	Dual Rates (SDFR / SLFR)	Single Overnight Policy Rate (OPR)

- **Zero Fiscal Monetization:** CBSL data confirms zero primary-market government debt monetization since the implementation of the Central Bank Act, forcing the government to meet all funding needs through market-based competitive auctions.
- **Successful Inflation Deceleration:** Headline inflation fell rapidly from nearly 70% in late 2022 to the target range of 5%, stabilizing price expectations for businesses and households.

State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) & Energy Sector Restructuring

For decades, Sri Lanka's State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) particularly energy monopolies like the **Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB)** and **Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC)** served as severe fiscal drains. Subsidized retail pricing, unhedged foreign debt, overstaffing, and operational inefficiencies generated massive fiscal losses. When global fuel prices spiked or the LKR depreciated, these losses accumulated directly on state bank balance sheets, eventually requiring sovereign debt guarantees and government bailouts.

To break this cycle, the government executed a three-pronged restructuring strategy: **balance sheet cleanup**, **cost-reflective automated pricing**, and **legislative unbundling**.

1. Balance Sheet Restructuring & Debt Absorption

Prior to operational reforms, the massive legacy foreign debt accumulated by SOEs threatened commercial state banks (People's Bank and Bank of Ceylon).

- **Sovereign Debt Assumption:** The government took over government-guaranteed foreign currency debt from the balance sheets of CPC and CEB directly onto the sovereign balance sheet.
- **Reversal of Negative Equity:** By relieving SOEs of legacy debt service costs and recapitalizing them, the negative net equity position of CPC was reversed, restoring financial solvency to state commercial banks that had been exposed to default risk.

2. Automated Cost-Reflective Pricing Formulas

To prevent SOEs from selling electricity and fuel below production cost, automatic pricing formulas were codified:

- **Monthly Petroleum Pricing Formula:** The CPC established a monthly, formula-based price adjustment mechanism for auto-diesel, petrol, and kerosene. Prices adjust automatically based on benchmark Singapore Mean of Platts (MOPS) prices, freight/insurance rates, foreign exchange rates, and statutory taxes.
- **Quarterly Electricity Tariff Reviews:** Under Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) oversight, the CEB implemented forward-looking quarterly tariff adjustments. Tariffs dynamically reflect changes in coal prices, thermal fuel costs, generation mix (hydro vs. thermal ratio), and seasonal rainwater levels.
- **Fiscal Insulation:** This mechanism ended state-funded fuel and electricity subsidies, ensuring that international commodity price shocks are absorbed directly by market tariffs rather than added to the national debt.

3. Structural Unbundling: Sri Lanka Electricity Act, No. 36 of 2024

To permanently eliminate the vertically integrated monopoly model, Parliament enacted the **Sri Lanka Electricity Act, No. 36 of 2024**, replacing the legacy Ceylon Electricity Board Act:

Functional Unbundling: The monolithic CEB was split into separate corporate entities under the Companies Act, distinguishing **Generation**, **Transmission**, and **Distribution** functions.

- **National System Operator (NSO):** Established an independent, state-controlled NSO responsible for real-time power grid management, economic dispatch scheduling, and transmission planning.
- **Private Sector & Renewable Integration:** The Act introduced open-access transmission rules and a wholesale power market framework, enabling public-private partnerships (PPPs) and private renewable energy developers (solar/wind) to feed directly into the national grid.

4. Restructuring non-energy SOEs (Sri Lankan Airlines & Commercial Entities)

Beyond energy, the government moved to reduce state exposure in non-core commercial markets:

- **State-Owned Enterprises Restructuring Unit (SOERU):** Established under the Ministry of Finance to oversee divesting or finding strategic private partners for state enterprises.
- **Sri Lankan Airlines Restructuring:** The state initiated a balance sheet debt carve-out alongside a tender process for a strategic private partner/investor to absorb operational liabilities and modernize fleet management.
- **Commercial Divestments:** Non-strategic assets (such as state-owned hotel properties, insurance holdings, and telecom shares) were slotted for private capital injection to promote market competition.

5. Real-World Outcomes & Evidence

SOE Indicator	Pre-Reform Crisis (2022)	Post-Reform Status
CEB & CPC Operational Balances	Combined losses over LKR 500 billion+	Returned to Operational Profitability
Energy Subsidies	Unfunded, draining treasury	Zero Direct Fiscal Subsidies (Cost-Reflective)
Electricity Sector Structure	Single Vertically Integrated Monopoly	Unbundled into Commercial Successor Entities

- **Profitability Turnaround:** As confirmed by Ministry of Finance reporting, both CPC and CEB returned to operational profitability following the implementation of cost-reflective formulas and debt restructuring.

- **Fiscal Risk Mitigation:** The elimination of SOE cash-flow deficits directly supported the state's primary budget surplus targets, preventing fresh public debt accumulation.

Public External Debt Restructuring Execution

In April 2022, Sri Lanka announced a temporary standstill on servicing approximately **\$37 billion** in foreign-currency debt owed to foreign governments, commercial banks, and bondholders. To emerge from default and restore sovereign debt sustainability under the IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program, Sri Lanka had to execute complex debt restructuring across distinct creditor groups while satisfying two critical requirements:

1. **IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) Constraints:** Reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio to below 95% by 2032 and keeping gross financing needs below 13% of GDP.
2. **Comparability of Treatment (CoT):** Ensuring that no single creditor or group received preferential repayment terms over others.

1. Official Bilateral Creditor Restructuring (\$10.0 Billion)

Bilateral debt was split into two parallel negotiation tracks, which successfully concluded with signed restructuring agreements:

- **Official Creditor Committee (OCC) MoU:** Co-chaired by **Japan, France, and India**, the OCC (representing 17 bilateral creditor nations including the UK, Germany, and the USA) signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) covering **~\$5.9 billion**.
 - **Terms:** Principal repayments were frozen under a grace period extending through 2028. Post-grace repayments were extended across a 15-to-20-year timeline, with weighted average interest rates lowered to 2.1%.
- **China Exim Bank Bilateral Agreement:** Operating outside the OCC framework, China Exim Bank signed a separate bilateral agreement covering **~\$4.1 billion**.
 - **Terms:** Provided net-present value (NPV) relief through extended maturity and lower interest charges, ensuring strict equivalence with the OCC financial terms.

2. Commercial Debt & International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs) (\$14.2 Billion)

Negotiations with commercial private creditors comprising the **Ad Hoc Group of Bondholders** (international institutional investors) and the **Local Consortium of Sri Lanka** were finalized via a formal Exchange Offer managed by Citigroup in late 2024:

- **Baseline Debt Haircuts:** The exchange deal achieved an immediate **28% principal haircut** on existing sovereign bonds (\$12.5B) and an **11% haircut on Past Due Interest (PDI)** (\$1.9B).
- **Macro-Linked Bonds (MLBs) / State-Contingent Debt Instruments:** To bridge the gap between optimistic bondholder growth expectations and conservative IMF projections, Sri Lanka issued state-contingent **Macro-Linked Bonds** tied to GDP:
 - Upside Test: In 2028, a test measures average nominal USD GDP (2025–2027) and real cumulative GDP growth. If Sri Lanka's economy outperforms IMF baseline targets, principal reinstatements and step-up coupons activate.
 - Downside Test: If the economy underperforms due to external shocks or recession, additional principal haircuts and lower coupon rates apply, reducing debt service burdens.
- **Governance Bonds:** A \$1.6 billion tranche of specialized governance-linked bonds was introduced, including structural compliance clauses that reward the state for maintaining fiscal transparency and anti-corruption standards.
- **Local Option:** Domestic institutional holders of foreign-currency bonds were offered an option to convert ISBs into multi-year LKR Treasury Bonds to align with domestic financial sector regulatory limits.

3. Commercial Bank Facilities (China Development Bank & Syndicated Loans)

- **China Development Bank (CDB):** In September 2024, an in-principal agreement was reached with CDB to re-profile **\$2.1 billion** in commercial loans and syndicated facilities.
- **Mechanics:** Extended loan tenors and reduced interest margins brought CDB's debt relief contribution in line with the IMF DSA targets.

4. Real-World Outcomes & Evidence

Debt Restructuring Metric	Pre-Restructuring Default	Post-Restructuring Execution
Bilateral Debt Servicing	Suspended (In Default)	MoUs Signed; Payments Deferred to 2028+
ISB Outstanding Principal	\$14.2 billion	Restructured via 28% Baseline Haircut + MLBs
Sovereign Rating Status	Selective/Restricted Default (SD/RD)	Lifted Out of Default (Upgraded)

- **High Exchange Participation:** Over **97.8%** of bondholders accepted the ISB exchange offer, enabling Collective Action Clauses (CACs) to modify non-consenting bonds and preventing "holdout creditor" litigation risks.
- **Resumption of Foreign Infrastructure Financing:** Concluding official debt treatments satisfied international credit requirements, allowing multilateral and bilateral partners (such as Japan International Cooperation Agency - JICA) to unfreeze funding for halted capital infrastructure projects (e.g., airport extensions and urban water supply expansions).

Anti-Corruption & Governance Legislation

Sri Lanka's 2022 economic collapse was not merely a macro-financial crisis, but also a governance crisis. Decades of unmitigated corruption, discretionary tax exemptions, state capture, and opaque procurement eroded public trust and depleted treasury reserves.

Recognizing that macroeconomic stabilization could not succeed without systemic governance reform, Sri Lanka became the **first country in Asia to undergo an official IMF Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA)** in 2023. The findings led to legislative overhaul, institutional empowerment, and digitized public disclosure mechanisms.

1. The Anti-Corruption Act (ACA) No. 28 of 2023

Enacted in August 2023 to replace outdated laws from 1994, the **Anti-Corruption Act No. 28 of 2023** aligned Sri Lanka's legal framework directly with the **United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)**:

- **Expanded Scope of Offenses:** Codified specific criminal offenses, including sexual favors as a form of bribe, conflict of interest in public procurement, illicit enrichment, and trading in influence.
- **Protection for Whistleblowers & Witnesses:** Established legal immunity, confidentiality, and statutory protection against retaliation for individuals reporting corrupt practices within public or private institutions.
- **Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:** Empowered Sri Lankan law enforcement to investigate and prosecute bribery and money laundering offenses committed overseas involving Sri Lankan public officials or state assets.

2. Operational Empowerment of CIABOC

The Act restructured the **Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC)**, granting it institutional and financial independence:

- **Financial Autonomy:** CIABOC's budget is charged directly to the Consolidated Fund, preventing the Executive branch or Ministry of Finance from cutting funds during active investigations.
- **Expanded Investigative Powers:** Granted authority to execute wiretaps, request digital banking records, perform financial intelligence profiling, and conduct joint operations with international anti-money laundering (AML) agencies.
- **Merit-Based Appointments:** Established an independent Advisory Council to vet and recommend Commissioners based on professional integrity, preventing political appointments.

3. Digitized Centralized Asset Declaration System

To enforce transparency across all levels of government, the legacy paper-based asset declaration system was replaced by a modern digital portal managed by CIABOC:

- **Mandatory Digital Submissions:** The President, Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament, judges, provincial governors, and senior public servants are legally required to submit annual asset and liability declarations via the secure **Centralized Electronic System** portal.
- **Public Accessibility:** Key sections of financial asset declarations are made available for public search, empowering civil society and investigative journalists to monitor wealth accumulation while protecting private personal identification numbers.
- **Strict Statutory Deadlines & Penalties:** Declarations must be submitted by designated statutory deadlines, with failure to declare or intentional falsification carrying criminal fines and disqualification from public office.

4. Implementation of the IMF Governance Diagnostic Assessment Action Plan

Following the publication of the IMF Governance Diagnostic Report in September 2023, the government published an official **Governance Action Plan** covering 16 core structural recommendations:

- **Procurement Transparency:** Mandated public web portal disclosure of all large-scale state infrastructure contracts, along with beneficial ownership details of winning bidders.
- **Elimination of Discretionary Tax Incentives:** Revoked the power of individual ministers to grant custom tax exemptions or tax holidays under the Strategic Development Projects Act, transferring all tax concession approvals strictly to Parliament.

- **Asset Recovery Legislation:** Drafted dedicated **Proceeds of Crime / Asset Recovery** legislation to establish legal mechanisms for freezing, seizing, and repatriating stolen public assets hidden in offshore financial centers.

5. Real-World Outcomes & Evidence

Governance Metric	Pre-Reform Environment (2022)	Post-Reform Status
Legal Framework Alignment	Fragmented, 1994 legacy legislation	Fully aligned with UNCAC via ACA No. 28 of 2023
Asset Declarations	Opaque, physical paper filings	Centralized Online Public Portal Operationalized
Tax Exemption Authority	Ministerial discretion (SDP Act)	Parliamentary Oversight & Formal IMF Benchmark Integration

- **IMF Structural Benchmark Compliance:** Successive IMF reviews confirmed that Sri Lanka met critical governance benchmarks, including the publication of semi-annual public procurement contracts and beneficial ownership data.
- **Strengthened Anti-Money Laundering (AML/CFT) Ratings:** The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) recognized Sri Lanka's progress in tracking illicit financial flows, keeping the country off international high-risk "gray lists."

▪ What the Rest of the World Thinks (Global Evaluations)?

What the Rest of the World Thinks (Multi-Agency Evaluations)

Sri Lanka's economic recovery and reform trajectory are continuously assessed by international financial institutions, credit rating agencies, development banks, and sovereign creditor groups.

While the global verdict praises the country for executing one of the fastest macroeconomic stabilization programs among recent crisis-hit nations, global agencies maintain a cautious outlook regarding external vulnerabilities and reform sustainability.

SRI LANKA REFORM & STABILIZATION ARCHITECTURE

Reform Pillar	Key Initiatives & Policy Measures
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Fiscal Consolidation	18% Standardized VAT RAMIS II Tax Digitalization CEB 6-Way Unbundling PFM Act Primary Surplus Target
Monetary Autonomy	Central Bank Act No. 16 Ban on Money Printing 5% Flexible Inflation Targeting Framework
Structural & Debt Reform	Official Creditor MoUs Private ISB Bond Swap Public Debt Management Act & Anti-Corruption

1. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)

The IMF serves as the primary anchor for Sri Lanka's economic reform program through a 48-month, **SDR 2.286 billion (\$3.0 billion)** Extended Fund Facility (EFF) approved in March 2023.

Official Evaluation & Program Disbursements

- **Completed Combined 5th & 6th Reviews (May 2026):** The IMF Executive Board completed the combined Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the EFF, granting immediate access to **SDR 508 million (\$695 million)**. This brought total IMF disbursements under the arrangement to **SDR 1.778 billion (\$2.4 billion)**.
- **Quantitative Benchmarks Met:** The IMF confirmed that all end-December 2025 quantitative performance criteria (QPCs) and key structural benchmarks were successfully met or implemented. Sri Lanka achieved a historic **primary fiscal surplus of 5.4% of GDP in 2025**, far outperforming the initial target.

IMF EXTENDED FUND FACILITY (EFF) DISBURSEMENT TRACKER

[Mar 2023] Initial EFF Approval —> SDR 228.6M (\$300M)

[Dec 2023] First Review —> SDR 254.0M (\$337M)

[Jun 2024] Second Review —> SDR 254.0M (\$336M)

[Dec 2024] Third Review —> SDR 254.0M (\$334M)

[Jul 2025] Fourth Review —> SDR 254.0M (\$350M)

[May 2026] Combined 5th/6th —> SDR 508.0M (\$695M)

TOTAL DISBURSED TO DATE: SDR 1.778B (\$2.4 billion)

Official Statement: Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair

"Sri Lanka's strong implementation under the EFF arrangement has continued despite challenging circumstances. Gains from the economic reform program helped preserve economic resilience and provided room to respond to Cyclone Ditwah and the Middle East war... Fiscal easing in 2026 is appropriate in response to the shocks, while temporary relief is implemented. From 2027 onward, the authorities are appropriately committed to reverting to the primary balance target of 2.3 percent of GDP."

— **Source:** IMF Press Release No. 26/172 (May 27, 2026)

2. Global Credit Rating Agencies (Fitch Ratings, S&P Global, Moody's)

Global credit rating agencies evaluate Sri Lanka's sovereign debt profile through credit risk metrics.

Rating Actions & Upgrades Out of Default

Following the completion of external debt restructuring, including commercial bond swaps (ISBs) and bilateral official MoUs rating agencies lifted Sri Lanka's sovereign foreign-currency rating out of **Selective Default (SD) / Restricted Default (RD)**.

- **Current Baseline Credit Tier:** Ratings were upgraded into the '**CCC+**' / **Single-B** tier.
- **Key Strengths Cited:**
 1. Gross Official Reserves accumulating above **\$6.4 billion**.
 2. Sustained revenue-based fiscal consolidation (tax revenue rising past 14% of GDP).
 3. Controlled headline inflation anchored around the central bank's **5% target**.
- **Key Risks & Constraints Cited:**

1. High debt-to-GDP ratio remaining near **96%**.
2. Elevated interest-to-revenue ratio, which absorbs a significant share of annual government receipts.
3. External vulnerability to Middle East energy shocks, shipping costs, and global commodity price volatility.

3. World Bank & Asian Development Bank (ADB)

Multilateral development banks transitioned their engagement from short-term emergency stabilization toward long-term structural competitiveness and social safety nets.

World Bank REGROW DPO (\$150 Million Approved July 2026)

On **July 1, 2026**, the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors approved **\$150 million in budget support** under the Reforms for Growth, Resilience and Openness Development Policy Operation (REGROW DPO). This marked a shift from stabilization (under the previous RESET series) to unlocking long-term private sector investment.

Official Statement: Gevorg Sargsyan, World Bank Country Manager

"Sri Lanka has made significant progress in stabilizing its economy, and now it is critical to advance reforms that can unlock private investment, facilitate high value export and create jobs. The REGROW DPO supports the transition to a more competitive, transparent, and resilient economy – one that can deliver sustainable and inclusive growth for all Sri Lankans."

— **Source:** World Bank Official Press Release (July 1, 2026)

The "Aswesuma" Social Safety Net Evaluation

- **Social Protection Expansion:** To cushion vulnerable households against cost-reflective electricity and fuel tariffs, the World Bank and ADB co-funded the **"Aswesuma" cash transfer program**, expanding coverage to **over 2.4 million low-income families**.
- **Targeting Modernization:** The World Bank commended Sri Lanka for establishing a digitized, welfare benefit portal, replacing political patronage with objective household proxy-means testing.

4. Foreign Sovereign Creditors (Official Creditor Committee & China)

Sovereign lenders evaluate Sri Lanka through the lens of geopolitics, financial risk, and debt repayment compliance.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN CREDITOR POSITIONING	
OFFICIAL CREDITOR COMMITTEE (OCC) Co-Chaired by Japan, France & India	CHINA (EXIM BANK & CDB) Separate Bilateral Framework
• Endorsed financial terms for \$5.9B bilateral debt re-profiling through 2028 • Enforced "Comparability of Treatment" (CoT). • Japan/JICA unfroze funding for major capital infrastructure projects (e.g., BIA Airport).	• Signed bilateral agreement on \$4.1B Exim Bank debt. • CDB commercial debt re-profiled • Resumed Port City Colombo and strategic joint ventures.

- **Official Creditor Committee (OCC) Consensus:** Co-chairs Japan, France, and India praised Sri Lanka for adhering to the **Comparability of Treatment (CoT)** principle, ensuring fair treatment across both OCC and non-OCC creditors. Concluding the MoU allowed Japan (JICA) to unfreeze funding for suspended infrastructure projects, including the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) expansion.
- **China Exim Bank & CDB:** China confirmed bilateral restructuring terms matching the OCC's financial parameters. This cleared the way for resuming strategic commercial development projects under public-private partnership (PPP) frameworks.

Summary of Global Multi-Agency Evaluations

Institutional Evaluator	Primary Assessment Focus	Current Official Verdict
IMF	Macroeconomic stabilization & structural benchmarks	" Strong Performance "; Approved \$695M combined 5th/6th review
Credit Rating Agencies	Sovereign default risk & debt service capability	Upgraded out of Default to 'CCC+'; Monitoring high debt-to-GDP
World Bank / ADB	Structural growth, trade & social protection	Approved \$150M REGROW DPO; Co-funding Aswesuma social transfers
Sovereign Creditors	Bilateral debt compliance & Comparability of Treatment	Signed MoUs; Unfreezing infrastructure funding lines

An empirical and comparative macroeconomic evaluation demonstrates that while structural vulnerabilities (governance, brain drain) and historical shocks (2019 Easter bombings, COVID-19)

created the fragile baseline for Sri Lanka's economy, the **Shipping Crisis and Middle East Conflict (Category 6)** acts as the most pervasive macroeconomic shock.

Unlike localized or policy-correctable domestic factors, the Shipping Crisis and War simultaneously attacks all three pillars of Sri Lanka's external accounts: **energy import costs, export competitiveness, and foreign exchange (FX) inflows.**

Macro-Financial Analysis of the Shipping Crisis & War Shock

To quantify why Category 6 exerts a disproportionate toll on Sri Lanka's \$109 billion economy, we analyze its direct financial transmission channels across the **Balance of Payments (BoP), fiscal buffers, and inflation dynamics.**

1. Balance of Payments (BoP) & Import Bill Amplification

- **Energy Import Dependency:** Mineral fuels and crude petroleum constitute **18.8% to 19.0%** of Sri Lanka's total import bill (\$21.5 billion total imports). A 25% to 30% jump in global crude oil prices (e.g., Brent moving above \$100/barrel) increases Sri Lanka's annualized energy import cost by approximately **\$1.0 billion to \$1.2 billion**. In Q2 2026, monthly fuel import bills peaked at nearly **\$886 million**.
- **Maritime Freight & Insurance Surcharges:** The rerouting of commercial vessels away from the Red Sea and Suez Canal around Africa's Cape of Good Hope adds **10 to 14 transit days** for Sri Lanka's trade with Europe and North America. Freight container rates surged **25% to 40%**, accompanied by War Risk Surcharges. This creates a double penalty: higher costs for imported raw inputs (textiles, industrial chemicals) and reduced margins for Sri Lanka's key exports.

2. Export & FX Inflow Vulnerabilities

- **Middle East Remittance Concentration:** Approximately **80% of Sri Lanka's worker remittance originates** from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations. Remittances totaled a record **\$8.07 billion in 2025**. A regional escalation risks disrupting GCC labor markets; a hypothetical 10% to 20% drop in Middle East remittances drains **\$800 million to \$1.6 billion** in foreign exchange annually.
- **Agricultural & Industrial Export Exposures:** Over **25% of Sri Lanka's total tea exports** are shipped directly to Middle Eastern markets. Combined with higher shipping rates hitting the **\$5+ billion apparel industry**, Sri Lankan exporters face severe margin compression and buyer order cancellations due to delivery delays.

3. Financial Transmission Summary Table

Economic Indicator	Pre-Shock Baseline	War & Shipping Crisis Impact	Transmission Channel
Real GDP Growth	5.0% (2025)	Moderated to 3.0% – 3.5%	Input cost spikes, logistics bottlenecks, reduced industrial output
Headline Inflation (CCPI)	2.2% - 3.0%	Surged to 6.8% – 7.0%+	Imported cost-push inflation via fuel, electricity, and freight
Monthly Fuel Import Bill	\$350M – \$450M	Peaked at ~\$886M	Global crude surge & freight insurance premiums
Gross Official Reserves	\$6.4B – \$7.2B	Drain of ~\$900M	Central Bank FX intervention to absorb energy costs

Part II: One-by-One Comparative Argument

STRUCTURAL SHOCKS vs. EXTERNAL SYSTEMIC SHOCKS

Domestic / Sectoral Shocks • Policy Errors (Governance) • Local Disasters (Ditwah: \$1.4B) • Sectoral Hits (Tourism/Bombs/COVID) [Reversible via Domestic Policy]	Shipping Crisis & War (Cat. 6) • Uncontrollable Global Supply Chain Bottlenecks (Freight +25–40%) • Multi-Channel BoP Hit (Fuel/Energy) [Unhedgeable Exogenous Drag]
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Sri Lankan Economy – Comparison from 2015 – 2025 Central bank records

Year	Real GDP growth (%)	Policy interest rates (SDFR/SLFR)	Inflation	Share price	Annual return (%)
2015	+4.8%	6.00% - 7.50%	+2.8%	6,894.50	-5.54%
2016	+4.5%	7.00% - 8.50%	+4.5%	6,228.26	-9.66%
2017	+3.6%	7.25% - 8.75%	+7.1%	6,369.26	+2.26%
2018	+3.3%	8.00% - 9.00%	+2.8%	6,052.37	-4.98%
2019	+2.3%	7.00% - 8.00%	+4.8%	6,129.21	+1.27%
2020	-3.6%	4.50% - 5.50%	+4.2%	6,774.22	+10.52%
2021	+4.2%	5.00% - 6.00%	+12.1%	12,226.01	+80.48%
2022	-7.3%	14.50% - 15.50%	+57.2% (peak 69.8%)	8,502.49	-30.46%
2023	-2.3%	9.00% - 10.00%	+4.0%	10,654.16	+25.31%

2024	+5.0%	7.75% - 8.75%	+2.1%	15,944.61	+49.66%
2025	+5.0%	7.50% - 8.50%	+2.1%	21,344.77	+33.87%

Strategic Recommendations: Building Exogenous Resilience for 2026 and Beyond

1. Energy Risk Hedging & Strategic Fuel Reserves

- **The Problem:** The 2026 Middle East War exposed Sri Lanka's total exposure to spot-market oil price spikes, causing the monthly fuel import bill to surge 149.9% (to \$886M).
- **Recommendation:** Implement structural commodity hedging mechanisms through international financial institutions to lock in maximum price ceilings for crude oil. Accelerate public-private partnerships (PPPs) to expand state fuel storage infrastructure, (Placeholder1) such as modernizing the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm to maintain a minimum 90-day strategic fuel reserve, isolating domestic transport and energy tariffs from immediate global price shocks.

In accordance with the Agreement on an International Energy Programme (I.E.P.), each IEA country has an obligation to hold oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil imports and to be ready to collectively respond to severe supply disruptions affecting the global oil market. Member countries have substantial flexibility in how they meet the stockholding obligation. That can include stocks held exclusively for emergencies and stocks held for commercial purposes (both in the form of crude oil and as

2. Supply Chain & Trade Route Diversification

- **The Problem:** Over-reliance on traditional shipping corridors and concentration of tea exports in Middle Eastern markets left trade vulnerable to regional conflict and Cape of Good Hope rerouting costs.

- **Recommendation:** Fast-track new Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) across East Asia, South Asia (India), and the ASEAN region to diversify export destinations. Simultaneously, leverage Sri Lanka's strategic maritime positioning (Colombo, Hambantota, and Trincomalee ports) by establishing specialized bonded warehousing zones, turning the island into a regional transshipment and logistics buffer hub rather than a victim of supply chain delays.



3. Accelerated Transition to Domestic Renewable Energy

- **The Problem:** High dependence on imported fossil fuels for base-load electricity generation repeatedly siphons hard currency reserves during global energy crises.
- **Recommendation:** Aggressively scale up the national grid's target for renewable generation (solar, wind, hydro) from 50% to over 70%. By prioritizing fast-track regulatory approvals for utility-scale solar and offshore wind projects, Sri Lanka permanently reduces its net foreign currency energy import liability (currently 4% of GDP), creating direct immunity against external oil market volatility.

Power generation from renewable-energy technologies is increasingly competitive against fossil fuel options, coming closer to the historical cost range. The most dramatic decline has been seen for solar PV generation: the LCOE of solar PV was 38% less than the weighted average fossil fuel-fired alternatives in 2020, having been 44% more expensive in 2010. Also in 2020, the global weighted average LCOE of new onshore wind projects was 67% lower than the weighted average fossil fuel-fired alternative, having been 23% higher than the weighted average fossil fuel-fired equivalent in 2010. The new renewable capacity added since 2000 is estimated to have reduced electricity sector fuel costs in 2020 by at least USD 400 billion, showcasing the benefits renewable power can provide in terms of energy security.

Renewable power generation has become the default source of least-cost new power generation. The progress made in 2020 is a significant step toward transitioning to a system based on energy efficiency and renewable technologies.

4. Formalization & Corridor Defense of Remittance Inflows

- **The Problem:** Remittances were heavily concentrated in the Middle East (\$8+B pipeline), making national inflows sensitive to regional instability and black-market diversion.
- **Recommendation:** Diversify official labor export corridors toward East Asia, Europe, and North America for high-skilled labor to mitigate geographic risk. Concurrently, expand digital remittance channels and incentivize formal banking remittances through targeted tax micro-rebates, maintaining official reserve accumulation even during external crises.

Remittances are a lifeline for many people in Asia and the Pacific. The money sent by migrant workers to their families from abroad cover their day-to-day costs and investments. In countries with a high rate of emigration, remittances are a major source of foreign exchange earnings.

Several challenges limit the growth of remittances, such as the high cost of sending money, high levels of informal money transfers, and restrictive regulations. Digital services, including mobile money and online and bank account credits, have long been recognized as one of the key solutions to these pain points. However, while there has been an increase in digital transactions because of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, cash remains the predominant method of money transfer in the region.

This policy brief is adapted from a report published by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It recommends that the public and private sectors establish a comprehensive


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This policy brief is adapted from a report published by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It recommends that the public and private sectors establish a comprehensive and efficient digital remittance environment to transition people from cash to digital transfers and maximize the economic impact of remittances.

5. Establishment of a Sovereign Fiscal Contingency Reserve Fund

- **The Problem:** Hard-won primary budget surpluses (5.4%) were quickly strained when simultaneous shocks (Cyclone Dityah and the 2026 Middle East conflict) required emergency state relief and subsidies.
- **Recommendation:** Enact a legal framework under the Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) to automatically siphon a fixed percentage (e.g. 0.5%–1.0% of GDP) of annual tax revenues into an offshore, liquid **Sovereign Buffer Fund**. This fund would be legally restricted for use only during certified exogenous emergencies (global supply shocks or severe natural disasters), preventing the government from burning central bank reserves or increasing domestic debt during crises.



Conclusion

Between January 2025 and June 2026, Sri Lanka's economy underwent a decisive transition from post-crisis stabilization to structural consolidation, before being hit by a fresh wave of external vulnerabilities. Building on the hard-won domestic reforms enacted to correct the historic policy failures of 2019–2024, the nation maintained strong economic momentum throughout 2025. Real GDP expanded by 5.0% in 2025 and continued its upward trajectory with a 5.1% year-on-year expansion in the first quarter of 2026. Growth during this 18-month timeline was heavily driven by a surge in industrial and construction output—partially fueled by post-disaster reconstruction spending following Cyclone Ditwah in late November 2025 alongside steady contributions from financial services, IT, and a booming tourism sector that generated over \$3.2 billion in revenue. On the fiscal and monetary fronts, Sri Lanka strictly adhered to its four-year IMF Extended Fund Facility targets, achieving a historic 5.4% primary budget surplus in 2025 through digitized tax administration and cost-reflective energy pricing. Meanwhile, inflation remained well-anchored until early 2026, prompting the Central Bank to maintain an independent monetary policy that successfully contained price pressures far below the hyperinflationary peaks of the 2022 default.

However, the second quarter of 2026 starkly exposed the limits of Sri Lanka's domestic recovery against unwedgeable global shocks. Just as gross official reserves reached a post-crisis peak of \$7.3 billion in early 2026, the sudden outbreak of the Middle East War and Maritime Crisis delivered a catastrophic blow to the country's Balance of Payments. Forced vessel rerouting around Africa drove ocean freight rates up by 25% to 40%, while global oil spikes caused Sri Lanka's monthly fuel import bill to surge by 149.9% year-on-year to \$886 million in April 2026. This external shock simultaneously squeezed critical foreign exchange channels by disrupting tea exports to the Gulf, threatening worker remittances, inflating jet fuel costs for the national airline, and pushing headline inflation up toward 6.8%–7.3%. To protect the currency and cushion the trade deficit, the Central Bank was forced to pivot to monetary tightening hiking policy rates by 100 basis points in May 2026 and draw down nearly \$900 million in foreign reserves. Ultimately, this 18-month period demonstrates that while stringent legislative and fiscal reforms successfully repaired Sri Lanka's self-inflicted domestic weaknesses, the nation's remaining thin reserve buffers left its economic stabilization highly vulnerable to sweeping international crises.

*However, on 1st July 2026, Sri Lanka was officially classified into the upper middle income economy category.

Note: This upgrade is a useful, if double-edged, data point to close on. The World Bank's classification is based on 2025 Gross National Income per capita, so it reflects the recovery built before the Middle East war and shipping crisis, not the pressure the country came under afterward; the two facts describe different points in time rather than contradicting one another. It is also worth noting that the reclassification carries a practical cost: crossing the upper-middle-income threshold typically reduces a country's future access to concessional, low-interest loans from institutions like the World Bank, which is a complication for Sri Lanka just as it is trying to rebuild reserves. For a presentation, this is a good closing tension to flag: the country is statistically wealthier on paper, even as the case study above shows many ordinary households still feeling the squeeze from higher fuel, transport, and food prices.

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